gtools
Several concerns here: (1) There are two 'source=' arrays defined, which in bash means the second one silently overrides the first. The first source= line (pointing to sourceforge gnochm) is dead code and likely a copy-paste artifact, but it's suspicious. (2) The actual effective source is a tarball from manty.net which mirrors/archives old geocities content — this is an unofficial, personal/archival host, not an official upstream release mirror. (3) The package compiles and installs a C binary (gtools.c) from this unverified third-party source. The md5sums are present (not SKIP), so there is at least a checksum, but MD5 is weak and the host is non-authoritative. (4) The source is compiled C code that gets installed as a setuid-style multi-call binary with symlinks. The combination of: unofficial archival host + compiled C binary + weak MD5 checksum constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. This is a real medium-severity issue — not a false positive — because executed compiled code is sourced from a non-official personal/archival host with no way to verify authenticity beyond a weak MD5.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=('http://www.manty.net/www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Lakes/1486/gtools-0_1_0.tgz'
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): Several concerns here: (1) There are two 'source=' arrays defined, which in bash means the second one silently overrides the first. The first source= line (pointing to sourceforge gnochm) is dead code and likely a copy-paste artifact, but it's suspicious. (2) The actual effective source is a tarball from manty.net which mirrors/archives old geocities content — this is an unofficial, personal/archival host, not an official upstream release mirror. (3) The package compiles and installs a C binary (gtools.c) from this unverified third-party source. The md5sums are present (not SKIP), so there is at least a checksum, but MD5 is weak and the host is non-authoritative. (4) The source is compiled C code that gets installed as a setuid-style multi-call binary with symlinks. The combination of: unofficial archival host + compiled C binary + weak MD5 checksum constitutes a genuine supply-chain concern. This is a real medium-severity issue — not a false positive — because executed compiled code is sourced from a non-official personal/archival host with no way to verify authenticity beyond a weak MD5.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Jozef Riha <jose1711 at gmail dot com>
pkgname=gtools
pkgver=0.1.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Tool to read 2MGUI disks in Linux"
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://www.manty.net/www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Lakes/1486/smanty.html"
license=('GPL')
depends=('glibc')
source=("http://sourceforge.net/projects/gnochm/files/gnochm/0.9.11/gnochm-0.9.11.tar.gz" "Makefile.patch")
source=('http://www.manty.net/www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Lakes/1486/gtools-0_1_0.tgz'
'errno.patch')
prepare() {
patch -p1 -i errno.patch
}
build() {
gcc gtools.c -o gtools
}
package() {
install -Dm755 $srcdir/gtools $pkgdir/usr/bin/gtools
for f in gcopy gdir gimage gtype
do
ln -sf gtools "$pkgdir/usr/bin/$f"
done
install -Dm644 $srcdir/COPYING $pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/gtools/COPYING
install -Dm644 $srcdir/README $pkgdir/usr/share/doc/gtools/README
}
md5sums=('33c7806b35a99fb9dd95738f2017de83'
'5636003942f5c0de253b064c983f4f29')
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |