gui-for-clash

MEDIUM
maintainer newtalan 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary (GUI.for.Clash) downloaded from a GitHub release of the GUI-for-Cores organization. While GitHub releases are a common distribution mechanism, this is still a pre-compiled binary being installed directly to /opt without any source build step, creating a supply-chain risk if the release artifact were compromised. The icon is fetched from jsDelivr CDN pointing to the main branch (not a pinned commit), which is slightly concerning but mitigated by the sha256sum check. The binary itself has a sha256sum, which provides some integrity guarantee, but there is no reproducible build from source. The project (GUI-for-Cores/GUI.for.Clash) appears to be a legitimate open-source project with real upstream activity. The risk is a genuine medium: an executed binary from a third-party release, not clearly malicious but representing a real supply-chain concern if the release were tampered with before the sha256sum was recorded.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:25 "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/GUI-for-Cores/${_pkgname}@main/build/appicon.png"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary (GUI.for.Clash) downloaded from a GitHub release of the GUI-for-Cores organization. While GitHub releases are a common distribution mechanism, this is still a pre-compiled binary being installed directly to /opt without any source build step, creating a supply-chain risk if the release artifact were compromised. The icon is fetched from jsDelivr CDN pointing to the main branch (not a pinned commit), which is slightly concerning but mitigated by the sha256sum check. The binary itself has a sha256sum, which provides some integrity guarantee, but there is no reproducible build from source. The project (GUI-for-Cores/GUI.for.Clash) appears to be a legitimate open-source project with real upstream activity. The risk is a genuine medium: an executed binary from a third-party release, not clearly malicious but representing a real supply-chain concern if the release were tampered with before the sha256sum was recorded.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: newtalan <newtalan@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname='gui-for-clash'
4_pkgname='GUI.for.Clash'
5pkgver='1.15.1'
6pkgrel='1'
7pkgdesc='GUI for Clash'
8arch=('x86_64')
9
10license=('GPL3')
11
12depends=(
13 'glibc'
14 'webkit2gtk-4.1'
15)
16
17url="https://github.com/GUI-for-Cores/${_pkgname}"
18
19install="${pkgname}.install"
20
21# Bin package
22source=(
23 "${url}/releases/download/v${pkgver}/${_pkgname}-linux-amd64.zip"
24 "${pkgname}.desktop"
25 "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/GUI-for-Cores/${_pkgname}@main/build/appicon.png"
26 "${pkgname}.install"
27)
28
29sha256sums=('d4983c0e0e6cca1508562a36632ca5af9aea5d10c2c87d28d011196d803c1f80'
30 'aec5e2cc7c4fe3885fc57258f52100de8716fa8b93c8e9e0d62cc976c78f0502'
31 '8933f6159cb5de8bd623eefc0a82ebeab50c9633a4fee87ac2f30054938ff8a4'
32 '9f7062c9f445d26b677bb875e17b832845856882d41f53d83789960c33539ee6')
33
34package() {
35 msg "make ${pkgname} package"
36
37 install -Dm755 "${_pkgname}" -t "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
38 install -Dm644 *.png ${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/icon/${pkgname}.png
39 install -Dm644 *.desktop -t ${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications
40}
41

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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