gvst-vst-bin

maintainer Schmetzler · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads compiled VST plugin binaries (.so files) from gvst.uk, which is the official upstream vendor site for the GVST plugin suite. The cookie-fetching mechanism (curl -sc cookies.txt) is a legitimate anti-hotlinking measure used by this vendor, not an obfuscation technique. The binaries are installed into /usr/lib/vst and loaded by DAW applications, so they are effectively executed code. The main concern is: (1) no integrity verification beyond MD5 checksums (weak but present), (2) the cookie fetch at parse time (`_tmp=\`curl...\``) runs during makepkg sourcing which is unusual and slightly risky, and (3) the DLAGENTS override affects all https downloads in the build context. However, gvst.uk is the legitimate official host for these plugins, making this more of a 'sloppy packaging' issue than a genuine supply-chain threat. The binaries are from the official vendor, checksums are provided, and the pattern is consistent with working around a simple download gate. This is borderline medium/low — the executed-binary-from-host concern is real but the host is the official upstream, so the risk is low in practice.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

  • PKGBUILD:15 _tmp=`curl -sc cookies.txt https://gvst.uk/Downloads`
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads compiled VST plugin binaries (.so files) from gvst.uk, which is the official upstream vendor site for the GVST plugin suite. The cookie-fetching mechanism (curl -sc cookies.txt) is a legitimate anti-hotlinking measure used by this vendor, not an obfuscation technique. The binaries are installed into /usr/lib/vst and loaded by DAW applications, so they are effectively executed code. The main concern is: (1) no integrity verification beyond MD5 checksums (weak but present), (2) the cookie fetch at parse time (`_tmp=\`curl...\``) runs during makepkg sourcing which is unusual and slightly risky, and (3) the DLAGENTS override affects all https downloads in the build context. However, gvst.uk is the legitimate official host for these plugins, making this more of a 'sloppy packaging' issue than a genuine supply-chain threat. The binaries are from the official vendor, checksums are provided, and the pattern is consistent with working around a simple download gate. This is borderline medium/low — the executed-binary-from-host concern is real but the host is the official upstream, so the risk is low in practice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Dominik Wetzel <dimonok at web dot de>
2# Contributor: usrmusicman
3pkgname=gvst-vst-bin
4pkgver=20240925
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="GVST Plugin Suite."
7arch=('x86_64' 'i686')
8url="https://gvst.uk"
9license=('custom')
10groups=('pro-audio' 'vst-plugins')
11depends=('glibc' 'libcurl-gnutls')
12replaces=('gvst-vst')
13
14# Needed to get the cookie for the download
15_tmp=`curl -sc cookies.txt https://gvst.uk/Downloads`
16DLAGENTS=("https::/usr/bin/curl -b cookies.txt -L -o %o %u")
17
18_url="${url}/Downloads/Get"
19
20source_x86_64=("${_url}/AllGVSTLinux64.zip")
21source_i686=("${_url}/AllGVSTLinux32.zip")
22
23md5sums_x86_64=("e5ef7eb3eb7bd1d5bda572c5d6afa293")
24md5sums_i686=("4b866fc29297c60fdc9ede09efd3cf2f")
25
26package() {
27 ## Install GVST
28 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/lib/vst
29 cp $srcdir/*.so $pkgdir/usr/lib/vst
30
31 ## Install License
32 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/GVSTLicense.txt" "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
33}
34

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion