hackhands-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from packagecloud.io (a legitimate third-party package hosting service used by many vendors) for the hackhands desktop application. The binary is then extracted and installed directly without any source build. While packagecloud.io is a well-known hosting platform and the SHA256 checksum is pinned, this is still a prebuilt binary from a non-distro host that gets executed on the user's system. The hackhands.com service appears to be defunct/acquired, raising questions about ongoing maintenance and whether the package host remains under the original vendor's control. The core concern is a prebuilt binary installed from a third-party host — this is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (not a false positive), as the binary could contain arbitrary code and the vendor's continued control of the packagecloud.io repository is uncertain for a potentially defunct service.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:25
source_x86_64=("https://packagecloud.io/hackhands/desktop/packages/ubuntu/xenial/hackhands_${pkgver}_amd64.deb/download")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from packagecloud.io (a legitimate third-party package hosting service used by many vendors) for the hackhands desktop application. The binary is then extracted and installed directly without any source build. While packagecloud.io is a well-known hosting platform and the SHA256 checksum is pinned, this is still a prebuilt binary from a non-distro host that gets executed on the user's system. The hackhands.com service appears to be defunct/acquired, raising questions about ongoing maintenance and whether the package host remains under the original vendor's control. The core concern is a prebuilt binary installed from a third-party host — this is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (not a false positive), as the binary could contain arbitrary code and the vendor's continued control of the packagecloud.io repository is uncertain for a potentially defunct service.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: David Govea <govea.du@gmail.com>
# Contributor: Daniel Wyatt <Daniel.Wyatt@gmail.com>
pkgname=hackhands-bin
pkgver=2.0.1
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="An easy and convenient way to get notified and connect to requests on hackhands.com"
arch=('x86_64')
url='https://hackhands.com'
license=('custom')
depends=('bash-completion'
'desktop-file-utils'
'gconf'
'gtk2'
'gvfs'
'hicolor-icon-theme'
'libappindicator-gtk2'
'libnotify'
'libsystemd'
'libxtst'
'nss'
'xdg-utils')
optdepends=('gnome-keyring' 'libgnome-keyring')
options=('!strip')
source_x86_64=("https://packagecloud.io/hackhands/desktop/packages/ubuntu/xenial/hackhands_${pkgver}_amd64.deb/download")
sha256sums_x86_64=('c6ca321d8fcbf6c70b194f7c8ad5f08957e0daa89bc7170a9f3936831cf57519')
prepare() {
tar -xJf data.tar.xz
}
package() {
cp -r "$srcdir/usr" "$pkgdir"
cp -r "$srcdir/opt" "$pkgdir"
}
# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |