harrison-xt-plugins-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer from an S3 bucket owned by Solid State Logic (SSL, which acquired Harrison Consoles). The host 'eu1.download.solidstatelogic.com' is the official SSL download CDN, so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure. However, the package still executes a downloaded .run binary installer (sh '...run' --tar xvf) during the build phase, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the S3 object were replaced or the bucket misconfigured, arbitrary code would execute. The sha256sum provides some protection but only against accidental corruption, not a deliberate substitution at the source. The pattern of running a binary installer and then extracting its contents is a legitimate but risky packaging approach. This warrants medium severity: it is an executed binary from a vendor CDN (not a personal/unofficial host), but the execution of a .run installer during package() is a genuine supply-chain risk pattern that the AUR community typically flags.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/eu1.download.solidstatelogic.com/Harrison/Mixbus%2010/Mixbus-${pkgver}-${arch}.tar")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer from an S3 bucket owned by Solid State Logic (SSL, which acquired Harrison Consoles). The host 'eu1.download.solidstatelogic.com' is the official SSL download CDN, so this is not a random personal host — it is the vendor's own distribution infrastructure. However, the package still executes a downloaded .run binary installer (sh '...run' --tar xvf) during the build phase, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the S3 object were replaced or the bucket misconfigured, arbitrary code would execute. The sha256sum provides some protection but only against accidental corruption, not a deliberate substitution at the source. The pattern of running a binary installer and then extracting its contents is a legitimate but risky packaging approach. This warrants medium severity: it is an executed binary from a vendor CDN (not a personal/unofficial host), but the execution of a .run installer during package() is a genuine supply-chain risk pattern that the AUR community typically flags.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1pkgname=harrison-xt-plugins-bin
    
      2pkgver=10.0.0
    
      3pkgrel=1
    
      4pkgdesc="Harrison Consoles LV2 XT Plugin Suite"
    
      5arch=('x86_64')
    
      6url="https://harrisonconsoles.com/mixbus-plugins/"
    
      7license=('EULA')
    
      8groups=('lv2-plugins' 'pro-audio')
    
      9depends=('gcc-libs' 'glibc' 'libcurl-gnutls' 'libx11' 'libxau' 'libxcb' 'libxdmcp')
    
      10makedepends=('xdg-user-dirs')
    
      11source=("https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/eu1.download.solidstatelogic.com/Harrison/Mixbus%2010/Mixbus-${pkgver}-${arch}.tar")
    
      12sha256sums=('3c86d432900f9d57b342da633649b66577032c6304ec3cd5c9dd28251c5ed422')
    
      13
    
      14## Variables
    
      15_installer="Mixbus-${pkgver}-${arch}"
    
      16_app="Mixbus_${arch}-$pkgver"
    
      17
    
      18package() {
    
      19	## Install LV2 Plugins
    
      20	mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/lib/lv2"
    
      21
    
      22	## Extract Installer
    
      23	tar -xvf "$srcdir/`basename ${_installer}`.tar"
    
      24	sh "$srcdir/${_installer}.run" --tar xvf
    
      25
    
      26	## Extract Bundle
    
      27	tar -xvf "$srcdir/`basename ${_app}`.tar"
    
      28
    
      29	## Insstall LV2 Plugin
    
      30	cp -r "$srcdir/`basename ${_app}`/lib/LV2/Harrison.lv2" "$pkgdir/usr/lib/lv2/"
    
      31}
    
      32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2