hdsentinel

MEDIUM
maintainer Archttila 17 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD installs prebuilt closed-source binaries (for i686, x86_64, armv6h, armv7h) downloaded directly from hdsentinel.com, the official vendor domain. The binaries are executed directly on the user's system. While the domain is the legitimate upstream vendor, the package installs closed-source, unauditable binaries with no source code available, and the checksums are hardcoded (providing integrity but not authenticity). The x86_64 source is a zip but the package() function only calls gunzip, suggesting a potential build issue for that arch. The supply-chain risk is real but typical for closed-source freeware distributed as prebuilt binaries — the threat model is vendor compromise or checksum mismatch, not an active attack. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for closed-source binary packages in the AUR.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source_i686=($pkgname-$pkgver.gz::https://www.hdsentinel.com/hdslin/hdsentinel-019b.gz)
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD installs prebuilt closed-source binaries (for i686, x86_64, armv6h, armv7h) downloaded directly from hdsentinel.com, the official vendor domain. The binaries are executed directly on the user's system. While the domain is the legitimate upstream vendor, the package installs closed-source, unauditable binaries with no source code available, and the checksums are hardcoded (providing integrity but not authenticity). The x86_64 source is a zip but the package() function only calls gunzip, suggesting a potential build issue for that arch. The supply-chain risk is real but typical for closed-source freeware distributed as prebuilt binaries — the threat model is vendor compromise or checksum mismatch, not an active attack. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for closed-source binary packages in the AUR.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Hajos Attila <linux[dot]alucard[at]gmail[dot]com>
2# Contributor: János Illés <ijanos@gmail.com>
3
4pkgname=hdsentinel
5pkgver=0.20
6pkgrel=0
7pkgdesc="A freeware, closed source, SMART analysis tool"
8arch=('i686' 'x86_64' 'armv6h' 'armv7h')
9url="https://www.hdsentinel.com/hard_disk_sentinel_linux.php"
10license=('unknown')
11depends=()
12source_i686=($pkgname-$pkgver.gz::https://www.hdsentinel.com/hdslin/hdsentinel-019b.gz)
13sha256sums_i686=(2cf5ed4c407603344370fe50f00cedaa261363688326a1dc960dbed2d77d8634)
14source_x86_64=($pkgname-$pkgver.gz::https://www.hdsentinel.com/hdslin/hdsentinel-020-x64.zip)
15sha256sums_x86_64=(c88b94e897609f5cf46b535d8382b35ccf00d415ea139924baa9f215b90a0878)
16source_armv6h=($pkgname-$pkgver.gz::https://www.hdsentinel.com/hdslin/hdsentinel-018-arm.gz)
17sha256sums_armv6h=(0a292022724a4b8fdbd566398f359c453099628f6d7201cfd0059ff409809016)
18source_armv7h=($pkgname-$pkgver.gz::https://www.hdsentinel.com/hdslin/hdsentinel-armv7.gz)
19sha256sums_armv7h=(82e77b011030d99c4c784a72979cad520196eb520a8727f0d325431902914fc3)
20
21package() {
22 gunzip -k -f "$pkgname-$pkgver.gz"
23 install -m755 -D "$pkgname-$pkgver" $pkgdir/usr/bin/hdsentinel || return 1
24}
25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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