helden-software

maintainer Taijian · 10 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt JAR file directly from the upstream vendor's own domain (helden-software.de / online.helden-software.de), which is the official project website for 'Helden-Software', a well-known character management tool for the German pen-and-paper RPG 'Das Schwarze Auge'. Both sources come from the same vendor domain. The JAR is an executable artifact (run by java-runtime) and is pinned with a sha256sum, which mitigates substitution risk. The concern is real but limited: the host is the official upstream vendor, not a random personal server, and the checksum provides integrity verification. The main residual risk is that the vendor host could be compromised and the checksum updated in the PKGBUILD, but this is standard supply-chain risk for any binary package from a small vendor. The commented-out alternative (using the Debian package's JAR) and the note that the Debian package is outdated explain why the direct download is used. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: an executed binary from a small/unofficial host with checksum pinning.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("http://online.helden-software.de/rep/pool/main/h/${pkgname}/${pkgname}_${_debian_pkgver}_all.deb"
  • PKGBUILD:13 "http://www.helden-software.de/down/devel/91529a8/helden5.jar")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt JAR file directly from the upstream vendor's own domain (helden-software.de / online.helden-software.de), which is the official project website for 'Helden-Software', a well-known character management tool for the German pen-and-paper RPG 'Das Schwarze Auge'. Both sources come from the same vendor domain. The JAR is an executable artifact (run by java-runtime) and is pinned with a sha256sum, which mitigates substitution risk. The concern is real but limited: the host is the official upstream vendor, not a random personal server, and the checksum provides integrity verification. The main residual risk is that the vendor host could be compromised and the checksum updated in the PKGBUILD, but this is standard supply-chain risk for any binary package from a small vendor. The commented-out alternative (using the Debian package's JAR) and the note that the Debian package is outdated explain why the direct download is used. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: an executed binary from a small/unofficial host with checksum pinning.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Gunnar Bretthauer <taijian@posteo.de>
2# Contributor: shad0w73 <shad0w73@vmail.me>
3pkgname=helden-software
4pkgver=5.5.4.beta2
5pkgrel=1
6_debian_pkgver=5.5.2-1
7pkgdesc='Die Heldenverwaltung für das Pen&Paper-Rollenspiel "Das Schwarze Auge" (DSA)'
8arch=('any')
9url="http://www.helden-software.de"
10license=('custom')
11depends=('java-runtime' 'hicolor-icon-theme' 'bash')
12source=("http://online.helden-software.de/rep/pool/main/h/${pkgname}/${pkgname}_${_debian_pkgver}_all.deb"
13 "http://www.helden-software.de/down/devel/91529a8/helden5.jar")
14sha256sums=('15f129efc99f0ad97cc6d7956be625dc0e1aeb51a157323216f824dfda67c485'
15 'fbb4b8192d7956c20b4e4dac5b9d640b5d07bbdec03b8454e8c4b10240368548')
16noextract=('helden5.jar')
17
18prepare() {
19 cd "${srcdir}"
20 tar -xzf data.tar.gz
21}
22
23package() {
24 cd "${srcdir}"
25
26 # Binary
27 # use jar file from direct download because Debian Package is not updated yet
28 #install -Dm644 usr/lib/heldensoftware/helden5.jar "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/helden5.jar"
29 install -Dm644 helden5.jar "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/helden5.jar"
30
31 # Docs
32 install -Dm644 usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/changelog.gz "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/changelog.gz"
33 install -Dm644 usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/copyright "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
34
35 # Config
36 install -Dm644 etc/default/${pkgname} "${pkgdir}/etc/default/${pkgname}"
37
38 # Icons
39 #install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}"
40 #cp -r usr/share/icons "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
41 for _size in 16 32 48 64 72 96 128 192; do
42 install -Dm644 usr/share/icons/hicolor/${_size}x${_size}/apps/${pkgname}.png \
43 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${_size}x${_size}/apps/${pkgname}.png"
44 done
45
46 # Launcher
47 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
48 sed s/games/bin/ usr/share/applications/HeldenSoftware.desktop > "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
49
50 # Run-Script
51 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
52 sed "s/lib\/heldensoftware/share\/helden-software/" usr/games/${pkgname} > "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
53 chmod 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
54}
55

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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