hexhub-deb

MEDIUM

maintainer mineleng 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss.hexhub.cn, which is the vendor's own CDN/object-storage host for hexhub.cn. This is a common pattern for proprietary or closed-source tools distributing via AUR. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. However, the binary is a closed-source executable from a personal/small-vendor host with no reproducibility, no source build, and the host (oss.hexhub.cn) is not a widely audited distribution channel. The package installs an executed binary (a database/SSH/Docker management tool) directly from this host. This is a genuine medium supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer pushes a new pkgver without updating the checksum, arbitrary code could be executed. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct here — not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source=("${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://oss.hexhub.cn/plugin/HexHub-amd64-deb-${pkgver}.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss.hexhub.cn, which is the vendor's own CDN/object-storage host for hexhub.cn. This is a common pattern for proprietary or closed-source tools distributing via AUR. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. However, the binary is a closed-source executable from a personal/small-vendor host with no reproducibility, no source build, and the host (oss.hexhub.cn) is not a widely audited distribution channel. The package installs an executed binary (a database/SSH/Docker management tool) directly from this host. This is a genuine medium supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer pushes a new pkgver without updating the checksum, arbitrary code could be executed. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct here — not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: mineleng <15119587808@163.com>
    
      2pkgname=hexhub-deb
    
      3pkgver=1.3.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="HexHub"
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://hexhub.cn"
    
      8license=('GPL')
    
      9depends=()
    
      10pkgdesc="database, docker, ssh, sftp. all in one"
    
      11provides=('HexHub')
    
      12source=("${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://oss.hexhub.cn/plugin/HexHub-amd64-deb-${pkgver}.deb")
    
      13sha256sums=('a616a4e489feb7bea65e10feca1f0d569568de92442abfffcb1885a44190eb79')
    
      14
    
      15package() {
    
      16  # 解压 DEB 包中的 data 部分
    
      17  bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb" -C "${pkgdir}" data.tar.xz
    
      18  bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz" -C "${pkgdir}"
    
      19  rm -f "${pkgdir}/data.tar.xz"
    
      20}
    
      21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2