hexhub-deb

maintainer mineleng · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss.hexhub.cn, which is the vendor's own CDN/object-storage host for hexhub.cn. This is a common pattern for proprietary or closed-source tools distributing via AUR. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. However, the binary is a closed-source executable from a personal/small-vendor host with no reproducibility, no source build, and the host (oss.hexhub.cn) is not a widely audited distribution channel. The package installs an executed binary (a database/SSH/Docker management tool) directly from this host. This is a genuine medium supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer pushes a new pkgver without updating the checksum, arbitrary code could be executed. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct here — not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source=("${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://oss.hexhub.cn/plugin/HexHub-amd64-deb-${pkgver}.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss.hexhub.cn, which is the vendor's own CDN/object-storage host for hexhub.cn. This is a common pattern for proprietary or closed-source tools distributing via AUR. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. However, the binary is a closed-source executable from a personal/small-vendor host with no reproducibility, no source build, and the host (oss.hexhub.cn) is not a widely audited distribution channel. The package installs an executed binary (a database/SSH/Docker management tool) directly from this host. This is a genuine medium supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer pushes a new pkgver without updating the checksum, arbitrary code could be executed. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct here — not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: mineleng <15119587808@163.com>
    
      2pkgname=hexhub-deb
    
      3pkgver=1.3.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="HexHub"
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://hexhub.cn"
    
      8license=('GPL')
    
      9depends=()
    
      10pkgdesc="database, docker, ssh, sftp. all in one"
    
      11provides=('HexHub')
    
      12source=("${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://oss.hexhub.cn/plugin/HexHub-amd64-deb-${pkgver}.deb")
    
      13sha256sums=('a616a4e489feb7bea65e10feca1f0d569568de92442abfffcb1885a44190eb79')
    
      14
    
      15package() {
    
      16  # 解压 DEB 包中的 data 部分
    
      17  bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb" -C "${pkgdir}" data.tar.xz
    
      18  bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz" -C "${pkgdir}"
    
      19  rm -f "${pkgdir}/data.tar.xz"
    
      20}
    
      21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2