hexhub-deb

MEDIUM

maintainer mineleng 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss.hexhub.cn, which is the vendor's own CDN/object-storage host for hexhub.cn. This is a common pattern for proprietary or closed-source tools distributing via AUR. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. However, the binary is a closed-source executable from a personal/small-vendor host with no reproducibility, no source build, and the host (oss.hexhub.cn) is not a widely audited distribution channel. The package installs an executed binary (a database/SSH/Docker management tool) directly from this host. This is a genuine medium supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer pushes a new pkgver without updating the checksum, arbitrary code could be executed. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct here — not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source=("${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://oss.hexhub.cn/plugin/HexHub-amd64-deb-${pkgver}.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from oss.hexhub.cn, which is the vendor's own CDN/object-storage host for hexhub.cn. This is a common pattern for proprietary or closed-source tools distributing via AUR. The sha256sum is present and pinned, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat. However, the binary is a closed-source executable from a personal/small-vendor host with no reproducibility, no source build, and the host (oss.hexhub.cn) is not a widely audited distribution channel. The package installs an executed binary (a database/SSH/Docker management tool) directly from this host. This is a genuine medium supply-chain concern: if the host is compromised or the maintainer pushes a new pkgver without updating the checksum, arbitrary code could be executed. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct here — not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: mineleng <15119587808@163.com>
    
      2pkgname=hexhub-deb
    
      3pkgver=1.3.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="HexHub"
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://hexhub.cn"
    
      8license=('GPL')
    
      9depends=()
    
      10pkgdesc="database, docker, ssh, sftp. all in one"
    
      11provides=('HexHub')
    
      12source=("${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://oss.hexhub.cn/plugin/HexHub-amd64-deb-${pkgver}.deb")
    
      13sha256sums=('a616a4e489feb7bea65e10feca1f0d569568de92442abfffcb1885a44190eb79')
    
      14
    
      15package() {
    
      16  # 解压 DEB 包中的 data 部分
    
      17  bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb" -C "${pkgdir}" data.tar.xz
    
      18  bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz" -C "${pkgdir}"
    
      19  rm -f "${pkgdir}/data.tar.xz"
    
      20}
    
      21

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2