hmcl-pr-bin

maintainer c114514 · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt JAR file from 'alist.8mi.tech', which is a personal/third-party mirror host, not the official GitHub releases infrastructure for the HMCL project (github.com/burningtnt/HMCL or the canonical HMCL repo). The JAR is executed as a Java application (installed to /usr/share/java and launched via a script), so a compromised or substituted JAR could achieve code execution. Additionally, all sha256sums are 'SKIP', meaning there is zero integrity verification — any file served by that host would be accepted without validation. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: the combination of an unofficial third-party host, an executable artifact (JAR), and no checksum verification represents a real medium-severity risk. It is not clearly malicious, but the trust chain is broken.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 "${pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${pkgrel}.jar::https://alist.8mi.tech/d/mirror/HMCL-Snapshot/Auto/6eca40e4c4f0a33343a9fb76819bae57caf30cb8/HMCL-${_pkgver}.jar")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt JAR file from 'alist.8mi.tech', which is a personal/third-party mirror host, not the official GitHub releases infrastructure for the HMCL project (github.com/burningtnt/HMCL or the canonical HMCL repo). The JAR is executed as a Java application (installed to /usr/share/java and launched via a script), so a compromised or substituted JAR could achieve code execution. Additionally, all sha256sums are 'SKIP', meaning there is zero integrity verification — any file served by that host would be accepted without validation. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: the combination of an unofficial third-party host, an executable artifact (JAR), and no checksum verification represents a real medium-severity risk. It is not clearly malicious, but the trust chain is broken.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1pkgname=hmcl-pr-bin
2pkgver=3.6.unofficial_ad602ae
3_pkgver=3.6.unofficial-ad602ae
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="A Minecraft Launcher which is multi-functional, cross-platform and popular | PR Collection"
6arch=('any')
7url="https://github.com/burningtnt/HMCL"
8license=('GPL-3.0-or-later')
9depends=('java-runtime' 'hicolor-icon-theme')
10conflicts=('hmcl' 'hmcl-bin' 'hmcl-dev-bin' 'hmcl-beta-bin')
11source=("hmcl-pr.desktop"
12 "hmcl-pr-launch-script"
13 "${pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${pkgrel}.jar::https://alist.8mi.tech/d/mirror/HMCL-Snapshot/Auto/6eca40e4c4f0a33343a9fb76819bae57caf30cb8/HMCL-${_pkgver}.jar")
14sha256sums=('SKIP'
15 'SKIP'
16 'SKIP')
17
18noextract=("${pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${pkgrel}.jar")
19
20prepare() {
21 # extract icons from jar
22 # Thanks to @Misaka13514
23 local _iconfile
24 for _iconfile in icon.png icon@2x.png icon@4x.png icon@8x.png; do
25 jar -xf "${pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${pkgrel}.jar" "assets/img/${_iconfile}"
26 done
27}
28
29package() {
30 install -Dm644 "${pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${pkgrel}.jar" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/java/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.jar"
31 install -Dm755 "hmcl-pr-launch-script" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
32 install -Dm644 "hmcl-pr.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
33
34 # install icons
35 local _icon _iconfile
36 for _icon in 32:icon.png 64:icon@2x.png 128:icon@4x.png 256:icon@8x.png; do
37 _iconfile=${_icon#*:}
38 _icon=${_icon%:*}
39 install -Dm644 "assets/img/${_iconfile}" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${_icon}x${_icon}/apps/${pkgname}.png"
40 done
41}
42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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