hotspotshield-test-bin
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=("https://repo.hotspotshield.com/wirequard/hotspotshield-$pkgver.x86_64.rpm")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt x86_64 RPM binary from repo.hotspotshield.com, which is the vendor's own repository subdomain (Hotspot Shield is a legitimate commercial VPN product by Aura/AnchorFree). The domain is plausibly official vendor infrastructure rather than a random personal host. However, it is not a widely-known or independently verifiable distribution channel (e.g., not on GitHub releases, not a distro mirror), and the package installs a VPN client binary with network-level access and systemd integration directly from that host. A sha256 checksum is present, but it cannot be independently verified against any upstream manifest. The real concern is that a prebuilt VPN binary with deep system access (NetworkManager, dbus, systemd) from a non-standard host represents a genuine supply-chain risk: if the host is compromised or the binary is silently replaced, the attacker gains persistent network-level code execution. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern — not clearly malicious, but a real risk due to the combination of an unverified binary host and a highly privileged executed payload.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: begin-theadventure <begin-thecontact.ncncb at dralias dot com>
pkgname=hotspotshield-test-bin
pkgver=1.1.2
pkgrel=3
pkgdesc='Hotspot Shield VPN client for Linux. Internal build'
url='https://hotspotshield.com'
license=('custom')
arch=('x86_64')
depends=('dbus' 'libnl' 'networkmanager' 'systemd-libs')
provides=("hotspotshield-bin")
conflicts=("hotspotshield-bin")
source=("https://repo.hotspotshield.com/wirequard/hotspotshield-$pkgver.x86_64.rpm")
sha256sums=('5f80402651da2087849a9d8046c66d4e711d466d426fd5d58d6558977439b9af')
package() {
rm -dr usr/lib
mv usr/lib64 usr/lib
mv etc usr "$pkgdir"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |