huaweicloudmeeting

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The source URL points to Huawei's official cloud meeting software distribution host (softclient.meeting.huaweicloud.com), which is a legitimate vendor host. However, the URL has no version component — the same URL always resolves to 'the latest' build, meaning the sha256sum pinned in the PKGBUILD will silently break (or worse, pass if an attacker substitutes a matching binary) whenever Huawei updates the file. The package installs a prebuilt x86_64/aarch64 binary blob extracted from a .deb, which is executed code from a closed-source vendor. The sha256sum provides a point-in-time integrity check but offers no protection against a future silent replacement at the same URL. The PKGBUILD also strips most of the /opt tree (deleting non-resources files) and wraps the electron app in a shell launcher. The host appears to be the genuine Huawei vendor CDN, so this is not clearly malicious, but the versionless URL is a real supply-chain concern: any future update to the remote file will either break the checksum or (if the maintainer updates the sum without review) silently ship a new unreviewed binary. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain pattern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source=("https://softclient.meeting.huaweicloud.com/HUAWEICLOUDMeeting_DomesticOS.deb"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The source URL points to Huawei's official cloud meeting software distribution host (softclient.meeting.huaweicloud.com), which is a legitimate vendor host. However, the URL has no version component — the same URL always resolves to 'the latest' build, meaning the sha256sum pinned in the PKGBUILD will silently break (or worse, pass if an attacker substitutes a matching binary) whenever Huawei updates the file. The package installs a prebuilt x86_64/aarch64 binary blob extracted from a .deb, which is executed code from a closed-source vendor. The sha256sum provides a point-in-time integrity check but offers no protection against a future silent replacement at the same URL. The PKGBUILD also strips most of the /opt tree (deleting non-resources files) and wraps the electron app in a shell launcher. The host appears to be the genuine Huawei vendor CDN, so this is not clearly malicious, but the versionless URL is a real supply-chain concern: any future update to the remote file will either break the checksum or (if the maintainer updates the sum without review) silently ship a new unreviewed binary. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain pattern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Asuka Minato <i at asukaminato dot eu dot org>
    
      2pkgname=huaweicloudmeeting
    
      3pkgver=8.11.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="HuaWei Cloud Meeting"
    
      6arch=(x86_64 aarch64)
    
      7url="https://www.huaweicloud.com/product/meeting"
    
      8license=('custom')
    
      9depends=(bash electron20)
    
      10source=("https://softclient.meeting.huaweicloud.com/HUAWEICLOUDMeeting_DomesticOS.deb" # todo: this link has no version
    
      11        )
    
      12sha256sums=('73e0929fe6bc2b8b94c93f1b88bdce2e387ca289e5df00f80e0a9921c9ae0107')
    
      13
    
      14package() {
    
      15	tar -xvf data.tar.* -C $pkgdir
    
      16	echo -e "#!/usr/bin/bash\nelectron20 /opt/华为云会议/resources/app %U" | install -vDm755 /dev/stdin $pkgdir/usr/bin/huaweicloudmeeting
    
      17  find $pkgdir -name "*.desktop" -print -exec sed -i -r 's/Exec=.*/Exec=huaweicloudmeeting/' {} \;
    
      18  find $pkgdir/opt -type f -not -path "*/resources/*" -print -delete 
    
      19}
    
      20

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2