hub-kids

maintainer max.bra · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a zip from bce.mondadorieducation.it (Mondadori Education, the Italian educational publisher behind HUB Kids/HUB Scuola), extracts a Debian package from it, and installs a prebuilt binary (hub-kids-prod) directly onto the system. The host appears to be the legitimate vendor CDN for Mondadori Education's digital learning platform, not a random personal host, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk. The core concern remains: a prebuilt, closed-source binary is pulled from a vendor CDN with no reproducibility, no upstream signature verification beyond a single sha256sum, and installed as an executable. If the CDN were compromised or the URL silently redirected, arbitrary code would execute. This is a textbook supply-chain medium: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-distro, non-auditable source. The sha256sum provides some integrity guarantee against in-transit tampering but not against the vendor host itself being compromised or the binary being replaced at source.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:24 source=(https://bce.mondadorieducation.it/media_educar/contenuti/appdilettura/kidslinux.zip)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a zip from bce.mondadorieducation.it (Mondadori Education, the Italian educational publisher behind HUB Kids/HUB Scuola), extracts a Debian package from it, and installs a prebuilt binary (hub-kids-prod) directly onto the system. The host appears to be the legitimate vendor CDN for Mondadori Education's digital learning platform, not a random personal host, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk. The core concern remains: a prebuilt, closed-source binary is pulled from a vendor CDN with no reproducibility, no upstream signature verification beyond a single sha256sum, and installed as an executable. If the CDN were compromised or the URL silently redirected, arbitrary code would execute. This is a textbook supply-chain medium: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-distro, non-auditable source. The sha256sum provides some integrity guarantee against in-transit tampering but not against the vendor host itself being compromised or the binary being replaced at source.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: max.bra <max dot bra at alice dot it>
2
3pkgname=hub-kids
4pkgver=7.2.385
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="La piattaforma facile, gratuita e innovativa per la didattica digitale."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://www.hubscuola.it/download-app"
9license=('unknown')
10depends=('sdl2' 'unzip')
11optdepends=(
12'chromium: a modern browser for the application to work'
13'firefox: a modern browser for the application to work'
14'google-chrome: a modern browser for the application to work'
15'evince: a pdf viewer'
16'epdfview: a pdf viewer'
17'qpdfview: a pdf viewer'
18'mupdf: a pdf viewer'
19)
20options=(!strip)
21
22_debname=HUB-Kids.deb
23
24source=(https://bce.mondadorieducation.it/media_educar/contenuti/appdilettura/kidslinux.zip)
25sha256sums=('6576a5f73856880a97ad0d5de55492cba2f225fd138240da32b7cb73463f41ea')
26
27prepare() {
28 cd "$srcdir"
29 msg2 "Decompressing Debian package..."
30 ar xv "${_debname}" > /dev/null
31 tar -xf data.tar.zst > /dev/null
32
33 #find ./{etc,usr} -type d -exec chmod 755 '{}' \;
34 find ./usr -type d -exec chmod 755 '{}' \;
35 chmod 755 ./usr/local/bin/hubkids/hub-kids-prod
36}
37
38package() {
39 cd "$srcdir"
40 #cp -dpr --no-preserve=ownership {opt,usr} "$pkgdir"
41 cp -dpr --no-preserve=ownership ./usr "$pkgdir"
42}
43

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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