hyper8-bin
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:29
source_x86_64=("https://simonrepp.com/hyper8/packages/hyper8_${pkgver}-1+deb12_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from a personal domain (simonrepp.com) rather than an official forge, vendor CDN, or language-ecosystem mirror. The binary is extracted and installed directly. While a sha256sum is provided (offering integrity protection against transit tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the personal domain owner — if the domain or hosting were compromised, a malicious binary would pass the checksum check only if the attacker also updated the PKGBUILD. The maintainer appears to be the upstream author (same name/domain), which is a common and legitimate AUR pattern for self-hosted software, reducing but not eliminating the concern. The real risk is that there is no way to independently verify the binary's provenance or reproducibility. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-standard personal host with no GPG signature or reproducible-build verification.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Simon Repp <simon@fdpl.io>
arch=('x86_64')
depends=(
# hyper8-core dependencies
'ffmpeg'
'rsync'
# hyper8-desktop dependencies
'cairo'
'desktop-file-utils'
'gdk-pixbuf2'
'glib2'
'gtk3'
'hicolor-icon-theme'
'libsoup'
'pango'
'webkit2gtk-4.1'
)
install=hyper8-bin.install
license=('AGPL3')
options=('!lto')
pkgdesc='A static site generator for video publishing'
pkgname=hyper8-bin
pkgrel=1
pkgver=1.0.1
sha256sums_x86_64=('97d3ab6853fd8fc458804a465f6cd86157a8a47a2292d8ced9371d0dee0a0f81')
url='https://simonrepp.com/hyper8'
source_x86_64=("https://simonrepp.com/hyper8/packages/hyper8_${pkgver}-1+deb12_amd64.deb")
package() {
tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |