hyper8-bin

maintainer simonrepp · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from a personal domain (simonrepp.com) rather than an official forge, vendor CDN, or language-ecosystem mirror. The binary is extracted and installed directly. While a sha256sum is provided (offering integrity protection against transit tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the personal domain owner — if the domain or hosting were compromised, a malicious binary would pass the checksum check only if the attacker also updated the PKGBUILD. The maintainer appears to be the upstream author (same name/domain), which is a common and legitimate AUR pattern for self-hosted software, reducing but not eliminating the concern. The real risk is that there is no way to independently verify the binary's provenance or reproducibility. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-standard personal host with no GPG signature or reproducible-build verification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:29 source_x86_64=("https://simonrepp.com/hyper8/packages/hyper8_${pkgver}-1+deb12_amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from a personal domain (simonrepp.com) rather than an official forge, vendor CDN, or language-ecosystem mirror. The binary is extracted and installed directly. While a sha256sum is provided (offering integrity protection against transit tampering), the trust anchor is entirely the personal domain owner — if the domain or hosting were compromised, a malicious binary would pass the checksum check only if the attacker also updated the PKGBUILD. The maintainer appears to be the upstream author (same name/domain), which is a common and legitimate AUR pattern for self-hosted software, reducing but not eliminating the concern. The real risk is that there is no way to independently verify the binary's provenance or reproducibility. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from a non-standard personal host with no GPG signature or reproducible-build verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Simon Repp <simon@fdpl.io>
2
3arch=('x86_64')
4depends=(
5 # hyper8-core dependencies
6 'ffmpeg'
7 'rsync'
8 # hyper8-desktop dependencies
9 'cairo'
10 'desktop-file-utils'
11 'gdk-pixbuf2'
12 'glib2'
13 'gtk3'
14 'hicolor-icon-theme'
15 'libsoup'
16 'pango'
17 'webkit2gtk-4.1'
18)
19install=hyper8-bin.install
20license=('AGPL3')
21options=('!lto')
22pkgdesc='A static site generator for video publishing'
23pkgname=hyper8-bin
24pkgrel=1
25pkgver=1.0.1
26sha256sums_x86_64=('97d3ab6853fd8fc458804a465f6cd86157a8a47a2292d8ced9371d0dee0a0f81')
27url='https://simonrepp.com/hyper8'
28
29source_x86_64=("https://simonrepp.com/hyper8/packages/hyper8_${pkgver}-1+deb12_amd64.deb")
30
31package() {
32 tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
33}
34

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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