hyperbeam

MEDIUM
maintainer cebtenzzre 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from cdn.hyperbeam.com, which is the official CDN for the Hyperbeam project. The binary is executed during prepare() to extract its contents (--appimage-extract), and the extracted native application is then installed to /opt. A sha256sum is provided, which pins the specific binary. The concern is that this is a closed-source, prebuilt executable from a vendor CDN rather than built from source — standard for proprietary AppImage packaging in the AUR. The risk is real but typical for this class of package: if the CDN were compromised or the vendor pushed a malicious update, users would execute arbitrary code. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from a non-reproducible source), not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("https://cdn.hyperbeam.com/${_file}")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from cdn.hyperbeam.com, which is the official CDN for the Hyperbeam project. The binary is executed during prepare() to extract its contents (--appimage-extract), and the extracted native application is then installed to /opt. A sha256sum is provided, which pins the specific binary. The concern is that this is a closed-source, prebuilt executable from a vendor CDN rather than built from source — standard for proprietary AppImage packaging in the AUR. The risk is real but typical for this class of package: if the CDN were compromised or the vendor pushed a malicious update, users would execute arbitrary code. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from a non-reproducible source), not a false positive, but also not evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Cebtenzzre <cebtenzzre (at) gmail (dot) com>
2# Contributor: Marcel O'Neil <marcel at marceloneil dot com>
3
4pkgname=hyperbeam
5pkgver=0.21.0
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc='Shared Browser App'
8arch=('x86_64')
9depends=(dbus-glib gtk3 libdbusmenu-gtk2 libindicator-gtk2 nss)
10url='https://hyperbeam.com/'
11license=('custom')
12
13_file="Hyperbeam-${pkgver}.AppImage"
14source=("https://cdn.hyperbeam.com/${_file}")
15sha256sums=('ed4631b5ba93eb9080767826ac8ab8dbdd0dcbcb02c9bb7815081b5191cc77b2')
16
17prepare() {
18 chmod +x "${_file}"
19 "./${_file}" --appimage-extract &> /dev/null
20
21 # update executable path in .desktop file
22 sed -i "s/Exec=/Exec=${pkgname}/" "squashfs-root/resources/assets/xdg.desktop"
23}
24
25package() {
26 cd squashfs-root/
27 chmod 755 -R .
28
29 # application
30 install -dm 755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
31 cp -a . "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
32
33 # executable
34 install -dm 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
35 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
36
37 # .desktop file
38 install -Dm 644 "resources/assets/xdg.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
39
40 # icons
41 for i in 16 24 32 48 64 128 256 512 1024; do
42 install -Dm 644 "resources/assets/icons/png/${i}x${i}.png" \
43 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${i}x${i}/apps/${pkgname}.png"
44 done
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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