ica-securestore-pkcs11

MEDIUM
maintainer charlieREV 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from ca.ica.cz (I.CA, a Czech certificate authority) and installs a PKCS#11 shared library (libICASecureStorePkcs11.so) directly into /usr/lib/pkcs11/. This is a real supply-chain concern: a prebuilt, closed-source native shared library from a vendor's own distribution server is installed and will be loaded into sensitive cryptographic contexts (smart-card operations via p11-kit). The host ca.ica.cz appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor (I.CA is a well-known Czech CA), and the sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates some risk. However, there is no GPG signature verification, the library is proprietary/unauditable, and a compromised or malicious .so in the PKCS#11 slot could intercept private key operations. This is a textbook medium: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-standard (even if plausibly legitimate) vendor host with no cryptographic signature check beyond a hash.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:10 source=("https://ca.ica.cz/pub/SecureStore/linux/ica-securestore-pkcs11_${pkgver}-0_amd64.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from ca.ica.cz (I.CA, a Czech certificate authority) and installs a PKCS#11 shared library (libICASecureStorePkcs11.so) directly into /usr/lib/pkcs11/. This is a real supply-chain concern: a prebuilt, closed-source native shared library from a vendor's own distribution server is installed and will be loaded into sensitive cryptographic contexts (smart-card operations via p11-kit). The host ca.ica.cz appears to be the legitimate upstream vendor (I.CA is a well-known Czech CA), and the sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates some risk. However, there is no GPG signature verification, the library is proprietary/unauditable, and a compromised or malicious .so in the PKCS#11 slot could intercept private key operations. This is a textbook medium: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-standard (even if plausibly legitimate) vendor host with no cryptographic signature check beyond a hash.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: CharlieREV <charlie@revshell.cz>
2pkgname=ica-securestore-pkcs11
3pkgver=6.13.0
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="I.CA SecureStore PKCS#11 module (smart-card crypto token support)"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://ca.ica.cz/pub/SecureStore/linux/"
8license=('proprietary')
9depends=('gcc-libs' 'pcsclite' 'p11-kit')
10source=("https://ca.ica.cz/pub/SecureStore/linux/ica-securestore-pkcs11_${pkgver}-0_amd64.deb")
11sha256sums=('eb13b0ba96366011dd30bf5231885ae2120e7475d1ee5faedaf549e883c74354')
12install="${pkgname}.install"
13provides=('ica-securestore-pkcs11')
14
15build() {
16 cd "$srcdir"
17 mkdir -p "$srcdir/deb"
18 bsdtar -xvf "ica-securestore-pkcs11_${pkgver}-0_amd64.deb" -C "$srcdir/deb"
19 tar -xf "$srcdir/deb/data.tar.xz" -C "$srcdir/deb"
20}
21
22package() {
23 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/deb/usr/lib/pkcs11/libICASecureStorePkcs11.so" "$pkgdir/usr/lib/pkcs11/libICASecureStorePkcs11.so"
24 install -Dm644 /dev/stdin "$pkgdir/usr/share/p11-kit/modules/ica-securestore.module" <<EOF
25module: /usr/lib/pkcs11/libICASecureStorePkcs11.so
26EOF
27}
28
29

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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