idazki-desktop

maintainer zako · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.run file) from izenpe.eus — the official Basque Country public certification authority (CA) website — and extracts/installs its contents as executable binaries. Izenpe is a legitimate government-backed CA, so this is not a random personal host, but it is still a non-standard binary distribution channel (not a distro mirror, GitHub release, or language ecosystem registry). The .run file is a self-extracting archive containing a tarball with application binaries that are installed directly to /usr/local and executed at runtime. A sha256 checksum is present, which mitigates substitution risk at the time of packaging, but there is no PGP signature verification. The core concern is that prebuilt closed-source binaries from a non-standard host are being installed and will be executed by users — a genuine supply-chain risk if the host or the binary were ever compromised. This fits the medium category: real concern, not clearly malicious, official-ish vendor source.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:23 source=("https://www.izenpe.eus/contenidos/informacion/idazki_izenpe/es_def/adjuntos/${_pkgdld}")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer (.run file) from izenpe.eus — the official Basque Country public certification authority (CA) website — and extracts/installs its contents as executable binaries. Izenpe is a legitimate government-backed CA, so this is not a random personal host, but it is still a non-standard binary distribution channel (not a distro mirror, GitHub release, or language ecosystem registry). The .run file is a self-extracting archive containing a tarball with application binaries that are installed directly to /usr/local and executed at runtime. A sha256 checksum is present, which mitigates substitution risk at the time of packaging, but there is no PGP signature verification. The core concern is that prebuilt closed-source binaries from a non-standard host are being installed and will be executed by users — a genuine supply-chain risk if the host or the binary were ever compromised. This fits the medium category: real concern, not clearly malicious, official-ish vendor source.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Christian Pinedo <chr.pinedo@gmail.com>
2pkgname=idazki-desktop
3pkgver=3.6.2
4pkgrel=3
5_pkgdld="idazki-desktop-linux64.run"
6epoch=
7pkgdesc="Idazki Desktop application of Izenpe CA"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="http://www.izenpe.eus"
10license=('unknown')
11groups=()
12depends=()
13makedepends=()
14checkdepends=()
15optdepends=('ca-certificates-izenpe')
16provides=()
17conflicts=()
18replaces=()
19backup=()
20options=()
21install=idazki-desktop.install
22changelog=
23source=("https://www.izenpe.eus/contenidos/informacion/idazki_izenpe/es_def/adjuntos/${_pkgdld}")
24noextract=()
25sha256sums=('494eff1444c5d6bbbc5e45b22a73f821fb587f01989cd3964ef364e99d3a2c12')
26validpgpkeys=()
27
28prepare() {
29 install -d "${_pkgdld%.*}/$pkgname"
30 tail -n+22 $_pkgdld | tar -xz -C "${_pkgdld%.*}"
31 tar xf "${_pkgdld%.*}/$pkgname.tar" -C "${_pkgdld%.*}/$pkgname"
32 cd "${_pkgdld%.*}/$pkgname"
33}
34
35package() {
36 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/local"
37 cp -dr --preserve=mode,timestamp "$srcdir/${_pkgdld%.*}/$pkgname" "$pkgdir/usr/local"
38 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
39 install -m 0755 "$srcdir/${_pkgdld%.*}/$pkgname/idazki-desktop.desktop" \
40 "$srcdir/${_pkgdld%.*}/$pkgname/idazki-delegado.desktop" \
41 "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
42}
43

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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