infonotary-client-software

MEDIUM
maintainer s.pantaleev 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from repository.infonotary.com, which is the official repository of InfoNotary — a Bulgarian qualified trust service provider (QTSP) under eIDAS. This is not a random personal host; it is the vendor's own distribution server. However, the integrity check uses only an MD5 checksum (cryptographically broken, trivially collisable) rather than a SHA256/SHA512 hash or a GPG signature. The package installs executed binaries (Qt5-based GUI applications and smart card middleware) directly from this vendor host without any signature verification. While InfoNotary is a legitimate company, the weak integrity check (MD5 only) combined with a prebuilt binary from a non-Arch-official host constitutes a real, if modest, supply-chain risk: a MITM or server compromise could substitute the binary and the MD5 check would not reliably catch it. This fits the medium category: executed binary from an unofficial (non-distro) host with insufficient integrity verification, but not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:22 source=('http://repository.infonotary.com/install/linux/DEBS22/pool/non-free/i/infonotary-client-software/infonotary-client-software_'$pkgver'.1198_amd64.deb')
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from repository.infonotary.com, which is the official repository of InfoNotary — a Bulgarian qualified trust service provider (QTSP) under eIDAS. This is not a random personal host; it is the vendor's own distribution server. However, the integrity check uses only an MD5 checksum (cryptographically broken, trivially collisable) rather than a SHA256/SHA512 hash or a GPG signature. The package installs executed binaries (Qt5-based GUI applications and smart card middleware) directly from this vendor host without any signature verification. While InfoNotary is a legitimate company, the weak integrity check (MD5 only) combined with a prebuilt binary from a non-Arch-official host constitutes a real, if modest, supply-chain risk: a MITM or server compromise could substitute the binary and the MD5 check would not reliably catch it. This fits the medium category: executed binary from an unofficial (non-distro) host with insufficient integrity verification, but not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Slavi Pantaleev <slavi at devture.com>
2
3pkgname=infonotary-client-software
4pkgver=2.0.3
5pkgrel=9
6pkgdesc="InfoNotary client software - InfoNotary e-Doc Signer and InfoNotary Smart Card Manager."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="http://www.infonotary.com/"
9license=('unknown')
10depends=(qt5-base qt5-xmlpatterns nss openssl libldap-2.5)
11replaces=(infonotary-scardmanager)
12conflicts=(infonotary-scardmanager)
13optdepends=(
14 'ccid: generic USB Chip/Smart Card Interface Devices driver'
15 'omnikey_ifdokccid: driver for OmniKey smart card readers'
16 'bit4id-ipki: Bit4ID Universal Middleware (Smart Card driver)'
17 'bit4id-xpki: Bit4ID Universal Middleware (Smart Card driver)'
18 'pcsclite: smartcard middleware library (pcscd)'
19 'pcsc-tools: smartcard tools (pcsc_scan)'
20 'opensc: a set of libraries and utilities to work with smart cards'
21)
22source=('http://repository.infonotary.com/install/linux/DEBS22/pool/non-free/i/infonotary-client-software/infonotary-client-software_'$pkgver'.1198_amd64.deb')
23md5sums=('942ed036b2e75b7660f008a99b857618')
24install=$pkgname.install
25
26package() {
27 ar -xv *.deb || return 1
28 tar -xvf data.tar.[xg]z -C $pkgdir || return 1
29}
30

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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