ishell
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary ZIP from an Aliyun OSS bucket (ishell-down.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com) — a personal/vendor-controlled object storage bucket rather than an official distribution channel like GitHub releases or a distro mirror. The binary is then installed and symlinked into /usr/bin for execution. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against accidental corruption but does not protect against the bucket owner substituting a malicious binary at the same URL. The host is not a recognized official release infrastructure (no GitHub, no official project CDN with transparent release process), and the package is a closed-source SSH tool with AI features, making the supply-chain risk real: if the OSS bucket is compromised or the owner pushes a malicious update, users execute arbitrary code. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no source transparency.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:9
source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.zip::https://ishell-down.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/ishell_linux_$pkgver.zip")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary ZIP from an Aliyun OSS bucket (ishell-down.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com) — a personal/vendor-controlled object storage bucket rather than an official distribution channel like GitHub releases or a distro mirror. The binary is then installed and symlinked into /usr/bin for execution. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against accidental corruption but does not protect against the bucket owner substituting a malicious binary at the same URL. The host is not a recognized official release infrastructure (no GitHub, no official project CDN with transparent release process), and the package is a closed-source SSH tool with AI features, making the supply-chain risk real: if the OSS bucket is compromised or the owner pushes a malicious update, users execute arbitrary code. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no source transparency.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Tsaitang <tsaitang404@@gmail.com>
pkgname=ishell
pkgver=2.0.5
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="轻量又高性能的SSH工具IShell:AI加持,快人一步"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://ishell.cc/"
depends=()
source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.zip::https://ishell-down.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/ishell_linux_$pkgver.zip")
sha256sums=('3f98cf9af95200d647ee8f61a885bd800b360254141191f45cf8a0a7660b9215')
package() {
# 定义安装目标路径
install_dir="$pkgdir/usr/share/ishell"
# 创建安装目标路径
mkdir -p "$install_dir"
# 解压软件包到安装目标路径
bsdtar xf "$srcdir/ishell-$pkgver.zip" -C "$install_dir"
# 在安装目标路径创建快捷方式
mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
ln -s "/usr/share/ishell/bundle/ishell" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/ishell"
# 在安装目标路径创建.desktop文件
mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
echo "[Desktop Entry]
Name=ishell
Exec=ishell
Icon=/usr/share/ishell/bundle/data/flutter_assets/static/img/logo.png
Type=Application
Categories=Utility;" > "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/ishell.desktop"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |