jasmin-compiler-bin

maintainer Herbrant · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads and installs prebuilt binary .deb packages (a compiler and a library) from repo.formosa-crypto.org, which is the official Debian repository maintained by the Formosa Crypto project (the upstream maintainers of the Jasmin compiler). This is not a random personal host — Formosa Crypto is a well-known academic/industry cryptography project and this appears to be their official package distribution channel. However, it is still a non-mainstream, project-specific binary host rather than a widely audited mirror (like GitHub Releases or a major distro repo), and the packages are executed binaries/libraries installed directly into the system. The sha256sums are pinned, which mitigates substitution risk at download time, but does not protect against a compromised upstream host at the time the sums were recorded. The risk is a real but low-probability supply-chain concern: if repo.formosa-crypto.org were compromised, malicious binaries could be distributed. This fits the medium category — prebuilt binaries from an unofficial (though plausibly legitimate) host with pinned checksums.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:28 "${_pkgname}_${_jasmin_debver}_amd64.deb::https://repo.formosa-crypto.org/debian/pool/main/j/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}_${_jasmin_debver}_amd64.deb"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs prebuilt binary .deb packages (a compiler and a library) from repo.formosa-crypto.org, which is the official Debian repository maintained by the Formosa Crypto project (the upstream maintainers of the Jasmin compiler). This is not a random personal host — Formosa Crypto is a well-known academic/industry cryptography project and this appears to be their official package distribution channel. However, it is still a non-mainstream, project-specific binary host rather than a widely audited mirror (like GitHub Releases or a major distro repo), and the packages are executed binaries/libraries installed directly into the system. The sha256sums are pinned, which mitigates substitution risk at download time, but does not protect against a compromised upstream host at the time the sums were recorded. The risk is a real but low-probability supply-chain concern: if repo.formosa-crypto.org were compromised, malicious binaries could be distributed. This fits the medium category — prebuilt binaries from an unofficial (though plausibly legitimate) host with pinned checksums.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Davide Carnemolla <herbrant@protonmail.com>
2
3pkgname=jasmin-compiler-bin
4pkgver=2026.03.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Compiler for the Jasmin language for high-assurance and high-speed cryptography"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://github.com/jasmin-lang/jasmin"
9license=('MIT')
10
11depends=(
12 'ocaml'
13 'gmp'
14 'mpfr'
15 'ppl'
16)
17
18makedepends=('binutils' 'tar')
19
20# Debian packages
21_pkgname="jasmin-compiler"
22
23# Debian package versions
24_jasmin_debver="${pkgver}-1"
25_apron_debver="0.9.15-1"
26
27source=(
28 "${_pkgname}_${_jasmin_debver}_amd64.deb::https://repo.formosa-crypto.org/debian/pool/main/j/${_pkgname}/${_pkgname}_${_jasmin_debver}_amd64.deb"
29 "libapron_${_apron_debver}_amd64.deb::https://repo.formosa-crypto.org/debian/pool/main/a/apron/libapron_${_apron_debver}_amd64.deb"
30)
31
32sha256sums=('419e0287e6ae4188552288e837ecd03e926a8cd19910778bacda40507e87b7a5' 'c32aa0507c4afa33063bc8bb7bf64c1782684b723301ae35061736363a4ee555')
33
34package() {
35 cd "$srcdir"
36
37 # Extract Jasmin compiler
38 ar x "${_pkgname}_${_jasmin_debver}_amd64.deb"
39 for f in data.tar.*; do
40 [ -f "$f" ] && tar -xf "$f" -C "$pkgdir"
41 done
42
43 # Extract Apron libraries
44 ar x "libapron_${_apron_debver}_amd64.deb"
45 for f in data.tar.*; do
46 [ -f "$f" ] && tar -xf "$f" -C "$pkgdir"
47 done
48
49 # Remove Debian-specific changelog files
50 if [ -d "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$_pkgname" ]; then
51 rm -f "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$_pkgname/changelog.Debian"*
52 fi
53
54 # Install license file if present
55 if [ -f "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$_pkgname/copyright" ]; then
56 install -Dm644 \
57 "$pkgdir/usr/share/doc/$_pkgname/copyright" \
58 "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$_pkgname/LICENSE"
59 fi
60}
61

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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