jetbrains-space

maintainer iggyvolz · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt snap binary from api.snapcraft.io, which is the official Ubuntu Snap Store API endpoint — not a random personal host. However, this is still a non-JetBrains distribution channel: the snap is identified only by an opaque content-addressed hash ID (h2GSR1wZNkxXqL4g6jfQichyULVb2ucl_30.snap) rather than a versioned release from JetBrains' own servers. The snap is then extracted and installed as a native binary under /opt/space. The sha512sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk for this specific revision, but the snap store is not JetBrains' official distribution channel and the snap could contain bundled libraries or runtimes not auditable from the PKGBUILD alone. The concern is real but mild: Canonical's snap store does perform some vetting, and the hash is pinned. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (executed binary from a non-upstream distribution channel) rather than a clear attack, so medium is appropriate.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://api.snapcraft.io/api/v1/snaps/download/h2GSR1wZNkxXqL4g6jfQichyULVb2ucl_30.snap")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt snap binary from api.snapcraft.io, which is the official Ubuntu Snap Store API endpoint — not a random personal host. However, this is still a non-JetBrains distribution channel: the snap is identified only by an opaque content-addressed hash ID (h2GSR1wZNkxXqL4g6jfQichyULVb2ucl_30.snap) rather than a versioned release from JetBrains' own servers. The snap is then extracted and installed as a native binary under /opt/space. The sha512sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk for this specific revision, but the snap store is not JetBrains' official distribution channel and the snap could contain bundled libraries or runtimes not auditable from the PKGBUILD alone. The concern is real but mild: Canonical's snap store does perform some vetting, and the hash is pinned. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (executed binary from a non-upstream distribution channel) rather than a clear attack, so medium is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Katie Volz <iggyvolz@gmail.com>
2pkgname=jetbrains-space
3pkgver=2022.1.1
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="An all-in-one collaboration solution for software development, instant communication, and team and project management."
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://jetbrains.space"
8license=('proprietary')
9makedepends=('squashfs-tools')
10# https://search.apps.ubuntu.com/api/v1/package/space -> download_url
11source=("https://api.snapcraft.io/api/v1/snaps/download/h2GSR1wZNkxXqL4g6jfQichyULVb2ucl_30.snap")
12noextract=('h2GSR1wZNkxXqL4g6jfQichyULVb2ucl_30.snap')
13sha512sums=('c15a68d48c4afb2a9e565655b7d7387cf322dc628f3e274dcbe77a57f37448c66c442167bd7c82d8873032389159306aa2950510631436e3f3325c0a812e16fa')
14prepare() {
15 unsquashfs -f h2GSR1wZNkxXqL4g6jfQichyULVb2ucl_30.snap
16}
17
18package() {
19 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt"
20 cp -R "${srcdir}/squashfs-root" "${pkgdir}/opt/space"
21 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
22 ln -s "../../opt/space/space" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/space"
23 sed -i "s@\${SNAP}@/opt/space@" "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/meta/gui/space.desktop"
24 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/meta/gui/space.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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