jidugs

MEDIUM
maintainer taotieren 0 votes base jidugs-appimage scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt AppImage binary from wlhex.com, which appears to be the vendor's own domain (the app URL is jidugs.wlhex.com and the download is from jidugs.wlhex.com/download/). This is consistent with a small Chinese software vendor hosting their own releases rather than using GitHub releases or a major CDN. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. However, the host is not a well-known, auditable release infrastructure, the software is proprietary with a commercial license, and the AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract to unpack it. A compromised or malicious AppImage from this host would result in arbitrary code execution at install time. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a closed-source binary from a small, unverifiable vendor host that is executed during the build process, even though it appears to be the legitimate upstream distribution channel for this product.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:23 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}-x86_64.AppImage::https://jidugs.wlhex.com/download/极度公式-${pkgver}.AppImage")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt AppImage binary from wlhex.com, which appears to be the vendor's own domain (the app URL is jidugs.wlhex.com and the download is from jidugs.wlhex.com/download/). This is consistent with a small Chinese software vendor hosting their own releases rather than using GitHub releases or a major CDN. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. However, the host is not a well-known, auditable release infrastructure, the software is proprietary with a commercial license, and the AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract to unpack it. A compromised or malicious AppImage from this host would result in arbitrary code execution at install time. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a closed-source binary from a small, unverifiable vendor host that is executed during the build process, even though it appears to be the legitimate upstream distribution channel for this product.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: taotieren <admin@taotieren.com>
2
3pkgbase=jidugs-appimage
4pkgname=jidugs
5pkgver=1.5.1
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="极度公式 公式一键识别快速转换,几十项技术创新助力,快捷方便!"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://jidugs.wlhex.com/"
10license=('LicenseRef-scancode-commercial-license')
11provides=(${pkgname})
12conflicts=(${pkgname})
13replaces=()
14depends=(
15 glibc
16 hicolor-icon-theme
17 zlib
18)
19makedepends=()
20backup=()
21options=(!strip !debug)
22install=
23source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}-x86_64.AppImage::https://jidugs.wlhex.com/download/极度公式-${pkgver}.AppImage")
24sha256sums=('9398aacff7ec91d5e998a24c739500062d2fbce5617b050470cbcc52fad4d7ad')
25
26_install_path="/opt/appimages"
27
28prepare() {
29
30 chmod a+x ${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${CARCH}.AppImage
31 "./${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${CARCH}.AppImage" --appimage-extract >/dev/null
32 sed 's|AppRun|/opt/appimages/jidugs.AppImage|g' -i "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/jidugspc.desktop"
33}
34
35package() {
36 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${CARCH}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/${_install_path}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
37
38 local _icon
39 for _icon in 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024; do
40 install -Dm0644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${_icon}x${_icon}/apps/jidugspc.png" \
41 -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${_icon}x${_icon}/apps"
42 done
43
44 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/jidugspc.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
45 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}"/squashfs-root/LICENSE* -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
46}
47

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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