jidugs
jidugs-appimage
scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt AppImage binary from wlhex.com, which appears to be the vendor's own domain (the app URL is jidugs.wlhex.com and the download is from jidugs.wlhex.com/download/). This is consistent with a small Chinese software vendor hosting their own releases rather than using GitHub releases or a major CDN. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. However, the host is not a well-known, auditable release infrastructure, the software is proprietary with a commercial license, and the AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract to unpack it. A compromised or malicious AppImage from this host would result in arbitrary code execution at install time. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a closed-source binary from a small, unverifiable vendor host that is executed during the build process, even though it appears to be the legitimate upstream distribution channel for this product.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:23
source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}-x86_64.AppImage::https://jidugs.wlhex.com/download/极度公式-${pkgver}.AppImage")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt AppImage binary from wlhex.com, which appears to be the vendor's own domain (the app URL is jidugs.wlhex.com and the download is from jidugs.wlhex.com/download/). This is consistent with a small Chinese software vendor hosting their own releases rather than using GitHub releases or a major CDN. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. However, the host is not a well-known, auditable release infrastructure, the software is proprietary with a commercial license, and the AppImage is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract to unpack it. A compromised or malicious AppImage from this host would result in arbitrary code execution at install time. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a closed-source binary from a small, unverifiable vendor host that is executed during the build process, even though it appears to be the legitimate upstream distribution channel for this product.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: taotieren <admin@taotieren.com>
pkgbase=jidugs-appimage
pkgname=jidugs
pkgver=1.5.1
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="极度公式 公式一键识别快速转换,几十项技术创新助力,快捷方便!"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://jidugs.wlhex.com/"
license=('LicenseRef-scancode-commercial-license')
provides=(${pkgname})
conflicts=(${pkgname})
replaces=()
depends=(
glibc
hicolor-icon-theme
zlib
)
makedepends=()
backup=()
options=(!strip !debug)
install=
source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}-x86_64.AppImage::https://jidugs.wlhex.com/download/极度公式-${pkgver}.AppImage")
sha256sums=('9398aacff7ec91d5e998a24c739500062d2fbce5617b050470cbcc52fad4d7ad')
_install_path="/opt/appimages"
prepare() {
chmod a+x ${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${CARCH}.AppImage
"./${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${CARCH}.AppImage" --appimage-extract >/dev/null
sed 's|AppRun|/opt/appimages/jidugs.AppImage|g' -i "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/jidugspc.desktop"
}
package() {
install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${CARCH}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/${_install_path}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
local _icon
for _icon in 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024; do
install -Dm0644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${_icon}x${_icon}/apps/jidugspc.png" \
-t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/${_icon}x${_icon}/apps"
done
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/jidugspc.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}"/squashfs-root/LICENSE* -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |