jmars

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt shell installer script (jmars_5_public.sh) from jmars.mars.asu.edu, which is Arizona State University's official JMARS project host. This is the legitimate upstream vendor host for this NASA/ASU Mars GIS tool, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the pattern of executing a downloaded shell installer script during package() is a genuine supply-chain concern: the script runs with package() privileges, its contents are opaque (it's a self-extracting installer), and any compromise of the ASU host or the file would result in arbitrary code execution on the builder's system. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat. The host is institutional/official rather than personal, reducing (but not eliminating) the risk. This is a borderline medium: the execution of an opaque installer binary/script from an external host during build is a real supply-chain concern even if the host is legitimate, but it is not clearly malicious and the checksum is present.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("http://jmars.mars.asu.edu/downloads/jmars_5/jmars_public/jmars_5_public.sh" "jmars.desktop")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt shell installer script (jmars_5_public.sh) from jmars.mars.asu.edu, which is Arizona State University's official JMARS project host. This is the legitimate upstream vendor host for this NASA/ASU Mars GIS tool, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the pattern of executing a downloaded shell installer script during package() is a genuine supply-chain concern: the script runs with package() privileges, its contents are opaque (it's a self-extracting installer), and any compromise of the ASU host or the file would result in arbitrary code execution on the builder's system. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against a known-good hash, which mitigates substitution attacks somewhat. The host is institutional/official rather than personal, reducing (but not eliminating) the risk. This is a borderline medium: the execution of an opaque installer binary/script from an external host during build is a real supply-chain concern even if the host is legitimate, but it is not clearly malicious and the checksum is present.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Lubosz Sarnecki <lubosz@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=jmars
4pkgver=5.3.14
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Java Mission-planning and Analysis for Remote Sensing is a geospatial information system for Mars"
7arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
8url="https://jmars.mars.asu.edu/"
9license=('GPL')
10depends=('java-runtime-common' 'desktop-file-utils')
11source=("http://jmars.mars.asu.edu/downloads/jmars_5/jmars_public/jmars_5_public.sh" "jmars.desktop")
12install=jmars.install
13sha256sums=('a78ad4807b5dda59e11d38cf65cd4a49fd27776c39b42c5058a10fce893eccd6'
14 '63b95d3840f500530750d7bbdf6f23f4c97b76857f93957992972a2b71a12fd1')
15
16package() {
17 chmod +x jmars_5_public.sh
18 ./jmars_5_public.sh -q -dir "$pkgdir/usr/share/jmars/"
19 chmod +x "$pkgdir/usr/share/jmars/jmars"
20 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
21 install -Dm644 jmars.desktop "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
22}
23

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion