jnetmap
The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from rakudave.synology.me, which is a personal Synology NAS host rather than an official project release platform (GitHub releases, SourceForge, etc.). The binary is extracted and installed directly to /opt, then symlinked into /usr/bin — meaning arbitrary executable code from this personal host runs on the user's system. While a sha256sum is present (providing integrity against accidental corruption), it offers no protection if the host owner replaces the file with a new binary at the same URL. The project's official URL is rakudave.ch/jnetmap, and this Synology subdomain appears to be the maintainer's personal server acting as a download mirror, not a recognized release infrastructure. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a prebuilt Java application binary from a non-standard personal host that gets executed directly. The risk is real but not clearly malicious, fitting the medium classification.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:18
source=(https://rakudave.synology.me/jnetmap/${pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${subver}_all.deb)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from rakudave.synology.me, which is a personal Synology NAS host rather than an official project release platform (GitHub releases, SourceForge, etc.). The binary is extracted and installed directly to /opt, then symlinked into /usr/bin — meaning arbitrary executable code from this personal host runs on the user's system. While a sha256sum is present (providing integrity against accidental corruption), it offers no protection if the host owner replaces the file with a new binary at the same URL. The project's official URL is rakudave.ch/jnetmap, and this Synology subdomain appears to be the maintainer's personal server acting as a download mirror, not a recognized release infrastructure. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a prebuilt Java application binary from a non-standard personal host that gets executed directly. The risk is real but not clearly malicious, fitting the medium classification.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Helmut Stult <hst[at]e-mail[dot]de>
# Contributor: Jaroslav Lichtblau <dragonlord@aur.archlinux.org>
# Contributor: Christopher Rogers <slaxemulator@gmail.com>
pkgname=jnetmap
_pkgname=jNetMap
pkgver=0.5.6.739
_pkgver=0.5.6
subver=739
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Graphical network monitoring and documentation tool"
arch=('any')
url="http://rakudave.ch/jnetmap"
license=('GPL3')
depends=('java-runtime')
provide=('jnetmap')
conflicts=('jnetmap')
source=(https://rakudave.synology.me/jnetmap/${pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${subver}_all.deb)
sha256sums=('6a752e9e6971ce3c7553952f115c289c079a2d77d8e48c36741e8e2b4dd71fff')
package() {
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}/"
install -dm755 $pkgdir/usr/bin
ln -s /opt/$_pkgname/jnetmap "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/jNetMap"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |