jnetmap
The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from rakudave.synology.me, which is a personal Synology NAS host rather than an official project release platform (GitHub releases, SourceForge, etc.). The binary is extracted and installed directly to /opt, then symlinked into /usr/bin — meaning arbitrary executable code from this personal host runs on the user's system. While a sha256sum is present (providing integrity against accidental corruption), it offers no protection if the host owner replaces the file with a new binary at the same URL. The project's official URL is rakudave.ch/jnetmap, and this Synology subdomain appears to be the maintainer's personal server acting as a download mirror, not a recognized release infrastructure. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a prebuilt Java application binary from a non-standard personal host that gets executed directly. The risk is real but not clearly malicious, fitting the medium classification.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:18
source=(https://rakudave.synology.me/jnetmap/${pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${subver}_all.deb)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt .deb binary from rakudave.synology.me, which is a personal Synology NAS host rather than an official project release platform (GitHub releases, SourceForge, etc.). The binary is extracted and installed directly to /opt, then symlinked into /usr/bin — meaning arbitrary executable code from this personal host runs on the user's system. While a sha256sum is present (providing integrity against accidental corruption), it offers no protection if the host owner replaces the file with a new binary at the same URL. The project's official URL is rakudave.ch/jnetmap, and this Synology subdomain appears to be the maintainer's personal server acting as a download mirror, not a recognized release infrastructure. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a prebuilt Java application binary from a non-standard personal host that gets executed directly. The risk is real but not clearly malicious, fitting the medium classification.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Helmut Stult <hst[at]e-mail[dot]de>
# Contributor: Jaroslav Lichtblau <dragonlord@aur.archlinux.org>
# Contributor: Christopher Rogers <slaxemulator@gmail.com>
pkgname=jnetmap
_pkgname=jNetMap
pkgver=0.5.6.739
_pkgver=0.5.6
subver=739
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Graphical network monitoring and documentation tool"
arch=('any')
url="http://rakudave.ch/jnetmap"
license=('GPL3')
depends=('java-runtime')
provide=('jnetmap')
conflicts=('jnetmap')
source=(https://rakudave.synology.me/jnetmap/${pkgname}-${_pkgver}-${subver}_all.deb)
sha256sums=('6a752e9e6971ce3c7553952f115c289c079a2d77d8e48c36741e8e2b4dd71fff')
package() {
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.zst" -C "${pkgdir}/"
install -dm755 $pkgdir/usr/bin
ln -s /opt/$_pkgname/jnetmap "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/jNetMap"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |