journee-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from an Amazon S3 bucket (s3.amazonaws.com/journee-app/), extracts it, and installs it system-wide. This is a real supply-chain concern: S3 buckets can be misconfigured, taken over, or have objects replaced without notice, and there is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum. The sha256sum provides integrity for the specific version but does not authenticate the publisher. The host is not an official distribution channel (e.g., GitHub Releases for the project at adueck.github.io/journee), it is a personal/app-specific S3 bucket. The binary is executed during build (AppImage --appimage-extract runs the AppImage runtime), and the extracted contents are installed as a full Electron/AppImage application under /opt. This pattern — unverified prebuilt binary from a non-canonical host with no signing — is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain risk, consistent with the original rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://s3.amazonaws.com/journee-app/Journee-${pkgver}-x86_64.AppImage")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from an Amazon S3 bucket (s3.amazonaws.com/journee-app/), extracts it, and installs it system-wide. This is a real supply-chain concern: S3 buckets can be misconfigured, taken over, or have objects replaced without notice, and there is no GPG signature verification — only a sha256sum. The sha256sum provides integrity for the specific version but does not authenticate the publisher. The host is not an official distribution channel (e.g., GitHub Releases for the project at adueck.github.io/journee), it is a personal/app-specific S3 bucket. The binary is executed during build (AppImage --appimage-extract runs the AppImage runtime), and the extracted contents are installed as a full Electron/AppImage application under /opt. This pattern — unverified prebuilt binary from a non-canonical host with no signing — is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain risk, consistent with the original rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
2
3pkgname=journee-bin
4pkgver=1.1.2
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A simplified, RedNotebook-type journal/diary app. With a focus on minimal design and a distraction free writing environment"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url='https://adueck.github.io/journee'
9license=('Apache')
10provides=('journee')
11makedepends=('gendesk')
12options=('!emptydirs')
13noextract=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.AppImage")
14source=("${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://s3.amazonaws.com/journee-app/Journee-${pkgver}-x86_64.AppImage")
15sha256sums=('2b05513db146bc19db8dcb691ecbb9c50425a8e9387a801b5b6175b33c5b027f')
16
17package() {
18 chmod 755 ./${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.AppImage
19 ./${pkgname%-bin}-${pkgver}.AppImage --appimage-extract
20 install -Dm644 squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/512x512/apps/journee.png "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/journee.png"
21 gendesk -f -n --pkgname "${pkgname%-bin}" \
22 --pkgdesc "$pkgdesc" \
23 --name "Journee" \
24 --comment "$pkgdesc" \
25 --exec "${pkgname%-bin}" \
26 --categories 'Office;Application;' \
27 --icon "${pkgname%-bin}"
28 install -Dm644 "${pkgname%-bin}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
29 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
30 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt"
31 cp -avR squashfs-root/ "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname%-bin}"
32 ln -s /opt/${pkgname%-bin}/AppRun "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname%-bin}"
33 find "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname%-bin}" -type d -exec chmod 755 {} +
34}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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