jprq
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from a legitimate GitHub releases URL (azimjohn/jprq, a real open-source project). There is no obfuscation, no encoded payload, no exfiltration, and no active source substitution. However, there are genuine concerns: (1) no checksums/integrity verification (no sha256sums, no source= array with hashes), meaning a compromised release asset or MITM could deliver a malicious binary undetected; (2) the binary is downloaded at build time rather than declared in the source array, bypassing makepkg's integrity checking entirely; (3) the case statement has duplicate 'Darwin $CARCH' entries and the architecture matching is broken (CARCH is an Arch Linux variable, not an architecture string like 'x86_64', so the Linux cases will never match correctly). These are real packaging quality and security concerns but not an active attack — the source is a known public GitHub project with a legitimate release. This rates as medium risk due to the missing integrity verification of an executed binary, not high.
Triggered rules
llm_review
The static rules flagged this HIGH, but an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from a legitimate GitHub releases URL (azimjohn/jprq, a real open-source project). There is no obfuscation, no encoded payload, no exfiltration, and no active source substitution. However, there are genuine concerns: (1) no checksums/integrity verification (no sha256sums, no source= array with hashes), meaning a compromised release asset or MITM could deliver a malicious binary undetected; (2) the binary is downloaded at build time rather than declared in the source array, bypassing makepkg's integrity checking entirely; (3) the case statement has duplicate 'Darwin $CARCH' entries and the architecture matching is broken (CARCH is an Arch Linux variable, not an architecture string like 'x86_64', so the Linux cases will never match correctly). These are real packaging quality and security concerns but not an active attack — the source is a known public GitHub project with a legitimate release. This rates as medium risk due to the missing integrity verification of an executed binary, not high.
1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
download_then_exec
A file fetched with curl/wget (not part of source=(), so never checksum-verified) is later made executable or run — a fetch-and-execute pattern split across statements.
-
PKGBUILD:35
install -Dm755 ./jprq "$pkgdir/usr/bin/jprq"
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Davron <xamdamovdavron6@gmail.com>
pkgname='jprq'
pkgver=2.3
pkgrel=1
epoch=
pkgdesc="This is a free and open tool for exposing local servers to public network (the internet)"
arch=('any')
makedepends=("curl")
license=('MIT')
url="https://github.com/azimjohn/jprq/releases/download/2.3"
build() {
set -e
URL_PREFIX="https://github.com/azimjohn/jprq/releases/download/2.3"
case "$(uname -sm)" in
"Darwin $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-darwin-amd64" ;;
"Darwin $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-darwin-arm64" ;;
"Linux $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-linux-amd64" ;;
"Linux $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-linux-386" ;;
*) echo "Unsupported architecture: $(uname -sm)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
echo "Downloading $FILENAME from github releases"
if ! curl -sSLf "$URL_PREFIX/$FILENAME" -o "jprq"; then
echo "Failed to write to $INSTALL_DIR; try with sudo" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "jprq is successfully installed"
}
package() {
install -Dm755 ./jprq "$pkgdir/usr/bin/jprq"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |