jprq
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from a legitimate GitHub releases URL (azimjohn/jprq, a real open-source project). There is no obfuscation, no encoded payload, no exfiltration, and no active source substitution. However, there are genuine concerns: (1) no checksums/integrity verification (no sha256sums, no source= array with hashes), meaning a compromised release asset or MITM could deliver a malicious binary undetected; (2) the binary is downloaded at build time rather than declared in the source array, bypassing makepkg's integrity checking entirely; (3) the case statement has duplicate 'Darwin $CARCH' entries and the architecture matching is broken (CARCH is an Arch Linux variable, not an architecture string like 'x86_64', so the Linux cases will never match correctly). These are real packaging quality and security concerns but not an active attack — the source is a known public GitHub project with a legitimate release. This rates as medium risk due to the missing integrity verification of an executed binary, not high.
Triggered rules
llm_review
The static rules flagged this HIGH, but an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from a legitimate GitHub releases URL (azimjohn/jprq, a real open-source project). There is no obfuscation, no encoded payload, no exfiltration, and no active source substitution. However, there are genuine concerns: (1) no checksums/integrity verification (no sha256sums, no source= array with hashes), meaning a compromised release asset or MITM could deliver a malicious binary undetected; (2) the binary is downloaded at build time rather than declared in the source array, bypassing makepkg's integrity checking entirely; (3) the case statement has duplicate 'Darwin $CARCH' entries and the architecture matching is broken (CARCH is an Arch Linux variable, not an architecture string like 'x86_64', so the Linux cases will never match correctly). These are real packaging quality and security concerns but not an active attack — the source is a known public GitHub project with a legitimate release. This rates as medium risk due to the missing integrity verification of an executed binary, not high.
1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
download_then_exec
A file fetched with curl/wget (not part of source=(), so never checksum-verified) is later made executable or run — a fetch-and-execute pattern split across statements.
-
PKGBUILD:35
install -Dm755 ./jprq "$pkgdir/usr/bin/jprq"
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Davron <xamdamovdavron6@gmail.com>
pkgname='jprq'
pkgver=2.3
pkgrel=1
epoch=
pkgdesc="This is a free and open tool for exposing local servers to public network (the internet)"
arch=('any')
makedepends=("curl")
license=('MIT')
url="https://github.com/azimjohn/jprq/releases/download/2.3"
build() {
set -e
URL_PREFIX="https://github.com/azimjohn/jprq/releases/download/2.3"
case "$(uname -sm)" in
"Darwin $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-darwin-amd64" ;;
"Darwin $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-darwin-arm64" ;;
"Linux $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-linux-amd64" ;;
"Linux $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-linux-386" ;;
*) echo "Unsupported architecture: $(uname -sm)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
echo "Downloading $FILENAME from github releases"
if ! curl -sSLf "$URL_PREFIX/$FILENAME" -o "jprq"; then
echo "Failed to write to $INSTALL_DIR; try with sudo" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "jprq is successfully installed"
}
package() {
install -Dm755 ./jprq "$pkgdir/usr/bin/jprq"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |