jprq

MEDIUM
maintainer pro_username 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from a legitimate GitHub releases URL (azimjohn/jprq, a real open-source project). There is no obfuscation, no encoded payload, no exfiltration, and no active source substitution. However, there are genuine concerns: (1) no checksums/integrity verification (no sha256sums, no source= array with hashes), meaning a compromised release asset or MITM could deliver a malicious binary undetected; (2) the binary is downloaded at build time rather than declared in the source array, bypassing makepkg's integrity checking entirely; (3) the case statement has duplicate 'Darwin $CARCH' entries and the architecture matching is broken (CARCH is an Arch Linux variable, not an architecture string like 'x86_64', so the Linux cases will never match correctly). These are real packaging quality and security concerns but not an active attack — the source is a known public GitHub project with a legitimate release. This rates as medium risk due to the missing integrity verification of an executed binary, not high.

Triggered rules

Medium AI review downgraded a static finding llm_review

The static rules flagged this HIGH, but an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from a legitimate GitHub releases URL (azimjohn/jprq, a real open-source project). There is no obfuscation, no encoded payload, no exfiltration, and no active source substitution. However, there are genuine concerns: (1) no checksums/integrity verification (no sha256sums, no source= array with hashes), meaning a compromised release asset or MITM could deliver a malicious binary undetected; (2) the binary is downloaded at build time rather than declared in the source array, bypassing makepkg's integrity checking entirely; (3) the case statement has duplicate 'Darwin $CARCH' entries and the architecture matching is broken (CARCH is an Arch Linux variable, not an architecture string like 'x86_64', so the Linux cases will never match correctly). These are real packaging quality and security concerns but not an active attack — the source is a known public GitHub project with a legitimate release. This rates as medium risk due to the missing integrity verification of an executed binary, not high.

1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
High Downloaded file is executed download_then_exec

A file fetched with curl/wget (not part of source=(), so never checksum-verified) is later made executable or run — a fetch-and-execute pattern split across statements.

  • PKGBUILD:35 install -Dm755 ./jprq "$pkgdir/usr/bin/jprq"

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Davron <xamdamovdavron6@gmail.com>
2pkgname='jprq'
3pkgver=2.3
4pkgrel=1
5epoch=
6pkgdesc="This is a free and open tool for exposing local servers to public network (the internet)"
7arch=('any')
8makedepends=("curl")
9license=('MIT')
10url="https://github.com/azimjohn/jprq/releases/download/2.3"
11
12build() {
13 set -e
14
15 URL_PREFIX="https://github.com/azimjohn/jprq/releases/download/2.3"
16
17 case "$(uname -sm)" in
18 "Darwin $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-darwin-amd64" ;;
19 "Darwin $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-darwin-arm64" ;;
20 "Linux $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-linux-amd64" ;;
21 "Linux $CARCH") FILENAME="jprq-linux-386" ;;
22 *) echo "Unsupported architecture: $(uname -sm)" >&2; exit 1 ;;
23 esac
24
25 echo "Downloading $FILENAME from github releases"
26 if ! curl -sSLf "$URL_PREFIX/$FILENAME" -o "jprq"; then
27 echo "Failed to write to $INSTALL_DIR; try with sudo" >&2
28 exit 1
29 fi
30
31 echo "jprq is successfully installed"
32}
33
34package() {
35 install -Dm755 ./jprq "$pkgdir/usr/bin/jprq"
36}
37

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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