jumpman

MEDIUM
maintainer severach 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary tarball (Jumpman_lin.tar.gz) from cat.runhello.com, which is a subdomain of the game's official site (runhello.com). The url field confirms runhello.com is the upstream vendor. However, 'cat.runhello.com' is an unusual subdomain (not a standard release host like releases.* or downloads.*), and the package installs the binary directly to /opt without compilation. The sha256sum provides integrity checking, which mitigates tampering risk somewhat, but the binary is executed directly from an unofficial-looking subdomain of the vendor. The depends_x86_64 using lib32-* and the i686/x86_64 arch support with a single binary tarball suggests this is a 32-bit prebuilt binary being run on both architectures. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from a personal/unofficial host) but not clearly malicious — the domain appears to be the actual upstream vendor's infrastructure. The sha256sum check provides meaningful protection against in-transit tampering. This is a borderline medium/clean case; the subdomain is unusual but appears to be the vendor's own hosting.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 source=('http://cat.runhello.com/Jumpman_lin.tar.gz' "${pkgname}.sh" "${pkgname}.desktop")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary tarball (Jumpman_lin.tar.gz) from cat.runhello.com, which is a subdomain of the game's official site (runhello.com). The url field confirms runhello.com is the upstream vendor. However, 'cat.runhello.com' is an unusual subdomain (not a standard release host like releases.* or downloads.*), and the package installs the binary directly to /opt without compilation. The sha256sum provides integrity checking, which mitigates tampering risk somewhat, but the binary is executed directly from an unofficial-looking subdomain of the vendor. The depends_x86_64 using lib32-* and the i686/x86_64 arch support with a single binary tarball suggests this is a 32-bit prebuilt binary being run on both architectures. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from a personal/unofficial host) but not clearly malicious — the domain appears to be the actual upstream vendor's infrastructure. The sha256sum check provides meaningful protection against in-transit tampering. This is a borderline medium/clean case; the subdomain is unusual but appears to be the vendor's own hosting.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Chris Severance aur.severach aATt spamgourmet dott com
2# Contributor: Lukas Jirkovsky <l.jirkovsky@gmail.com>
3
4# TODO: needs a better icon
5
6set -u
7pkgname='jumpman'
8pkgver='1.0.2'
9pkgrel='2'
10pkgdesc='An addictve retro-style game'
11arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
12url='http://runhello.com/'
13license=('custom')
14depends_i686=('freetype2' 'glu' 'libgl' 'mesa' 'pcre' 'sdl' 'libpulse')
15depends_x86_64=("${depends_i686[@]/#/lib32-}" 'lib32-alsa-plugins')
16source=('http://cat.runhello.com/Jumpman_lin.tar.gz' "${pkgname}.sh" "${pkgname}.desktop")
17sha256sums=('f803df52902999b76b551b338ff61f7048787cdbada863ff4a8bf80ce212348c'
18 '00453d83415cbebe45bd600b6be28bbe065a76721e179adb93c4824ba9689c6a'
19 '934636c213556ab597d546a502b5a9c3c39998ed188b9c4efd583cf72af4217a')
20
21package() {
22 set -u
23 install -Dpm644 'Jumpman/Readme.txt' "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/Readme"
24 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt"
25 mv Jumpman "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
26
27 install -Dpm755 "${pkgname}.sh" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
28 install -Dpm644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
29 set +u
30}
31set +u
32
33# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
34

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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