jumpman

maintainer severach · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary tarball (Jumpman_lin.tar.gz) from cat.runhello.com, which is a subdomain of the game's official site (runhello.com). The url field confirms runhello.com is the upstream vendor. However, 'cat.runhello.com' is an unusual subdomain (not a standard release host like releases.* or downloads.*), and the package installs the binary directly to /opt without compilation. The sha256sum provides integrity checking, which mitigates tampering risk somewhat, but the binary is executed directly from an unofficial-looking subdomain of the vendor. The depends_x86_64 using lib32-* and the i686/x86_64 arch support with a single binary tarball suggests this is a 32-bit prebuilt binary being run on both architectures. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from a personal/unofficial host) but not clearly malicious — the domain appears to be the actual upstream vendor's infrastructure. The sha256sum check provides meaningful protection against in-transit tampering. This is a borderline medium/clean case; the subdomain is unusual but appears to be the vendor's own hosting.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:16 source=('http://cat.runhello.com/Jumpman_lin.tar.gz' "${pkgname}.sh" "${pkgname}.desktop")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary tarball (Jumpman_lin.tar.gz) from cat.runhello.com, which is a subdomain of the game's official site (runhello.com). The url field confirms runhello.com is the upstream vendor. However, 'cat.runhello.com' is an unusual subdomain (not a standard release host like releases.* or downloads.*), and the package installs the binary directly to /opt without compilation. The sha256sum provides integrity checking, which mitigates tampering risk somewhat, but the binary is executed directly from an unofficial-looking subdomain of the vendor. The depends_x86_64 using lib32-* and the i686/x86_64 arch support with a single binary tarball suggests this is a 32-bit prebuilt binary being run on both architectures. This is a legitimate supply-chain concern (prebuilt binary from a personal/unofficial host) but not clearly malicious — the domain appears to be the actual upstream vendor's infrastructure. The sha256sum check provides meaningful protection against in-transit tampering. This is a borderline medium/clean case; the subdomain is unusual but appears to be the vendor's own hosting.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer:  Chris Severance aur.severach aATt spamgourmet dott com
    
      2# Contributor: Lukas Jirkovsky <l.jirkovsky@gmail.com>
    
      3
    
      4# TODO: needs a better icon
    
      5
    
      6set -u
    
      7pkgname='jumpman'
    
      8pkgver='1.0.2'
    
      9pkgrel='2'
    
      10pkgdesc='An addictve retro-style game'
    
      11arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
    
      12url='http://runhello.com/'
    
      13license=('custom')
    
      14depends_i686=('freetype2' 'glu' 'libgl' 'mesa' 'pcre' 'sdl' 'libpulse')
    
      15depends_x86_64=("${depends_i686[@]/#/lib32-}" 'lib32-alsa-plugins')
    
      16source=('http://cat.runhello.com/Jumpman_lin.tar.gz' "${pkgname}.sh" "${pkgname}.desktop")
    
      17sha256sums=('f803df52902999b76b551b338ff61f7048787cdbada863ff4a8bf80ce212348c'
    
      18            '00453d83415cbebe45bd600b6be28bbe065a76721e179adb93c4824ba9689c6a'
    
      19            '934636c213556ab597d546a502b5a9c3c39998ed188b9c4efd583cf72af4217a')
    
      20
    
      21package() {
    
      22  set -u
    
      23  install -Dpm644 'Jumpman/Readme.txt' "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/Readme"
    
      24  install -d "${pkgdir}/opt"
    
      25  mv Jumpman "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
    
      26
    
      27  install -Dpm755 "${pkgname}.sh" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      28  install -Dpm644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
    
      29  set +u
    
      30}
    
      31set +u
    
      32
    
      33# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
    
      34

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2