kelvpn
This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from pub.kelvpn.com, which is the official distribution host for KelVPN (a commercial VPN product). The binaries are not built from source — they are extracted and installed directly. The host appears to be the vendor's own distribution server rather than a random personal host, which reduces (but does not eliminate) supply-chain risk. The sha256 checksums provide integrity verification against tampering in transit, but there is no GPG signature verification. The core concern is that prebuilt closed-source VPN binaries with network-level access are being installed, and trust is entirely placed in the vendor's distribution infrastructure. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binaries from a vendor-controlled but non-auditable host, with no source build and no cryptographic signature beyond checksums. Not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern for a VPN client that handles sensitive network traffic.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:10
source_x86_64=(https://pub.kelvpn.com/linux/master/KelVPN-7.7-90-amd64.deb)
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from pub.kelvpn.com, which is the official distribution host for KelVPN (a commercial VPN product). The binaries are not built from source — they are extracted and installed directly. The host appears to be the vendor's own distribution server rather than a random personal host, which reduces (but does not eliminate) supply-chain risk. The sha256 checksums provide integrity verification against tampering in transit, but there is no GPG signature verification. The core concern is that prebuilt closed-source VPN binaries with network-level access are being installed, and trust is entirely placed in the vendor's distribution infrastructure. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binaries from a vendor-controlled but non-auditable host, with no source build and no cryptographic signature beyond checksums. Not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern for a VPN client that handles sensitive network traffic.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Mika Hyttinen <mika dot hyttinen+arch ät gmail dot com>
pkgname=kelvpn
pkgver=7.7.90
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Decentralized quantum-secure VPN service. It provides the highest level of protection for your network connection, including quantum threat protection."
arch=('x86_64' 'aarch64')
url="https://kelvpn.com/"
license=('LicenseRef-custom')
provides=("kelvpn")
source_x86_64=(https://pub.kelvpn.com/linux/master/KelVPN-7.7-90-amd64.deb)
source_aarch64=(https://pub.kelvpn.com/linux/master/KelVPN-7.7-90-arm64.deb)
sha256sums_x86_64=('72bf88df644f97d3fdbc97f220ca5244c2e0b401271016469d86fb49d2dacbc9')
sha256sums_aarch64=('182016ef36d2dfc4ea912178c0b8dfd5a4d440a7421a04254ce0b3c6112666b9')
install=$pkgname.install
options=(!debug)
depends=(fontconfig freetype2 libgl libpng libx11 libxcb libxrandr networkmanager xcb-util-image xcb-util-keysyms xcb-util-renderutil xcb-util-wm zlib net-tools)
package() {
bsdtar -xf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir/"
mkdir -p "$pkgdir"/usr/bin
chmod -R 755 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/bin"
ln -sf "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/bin/KelVPN" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/$pkgname"
install -Dm 644 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/share/KelVPN.desktop" -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
install -Dm 644 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/share/KelVPNService.service" -t "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |