kelvpn

maintainer hyttmi · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from pub.kelvpn.com, which is the official distribution host for KelVPN (a commercial VPN product). The binaries are not built from source — they are extracted and installed directly. The host appears to be the vendor's own distribution server rather than a random personal host, which reduces (but does not eliminate) supply-chain risk. The sha256 checksums provide integrity verification against tampering in transit, but there is no GPG signature verification. The core concern is that prebuilt closed-source VPN binaries with network-level access are being installed, and trust is entirely placed in the vendor's distribution infrastructure. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binaries from a vendor-controlled but non-auditable host, with no source build and no cryptographic signature beyond checksums. Not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern for a VPN client that handles sensitive network traffic.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:10 source_x86_64=(https://pub.kelvpn.com/linux/master/KelVPN-7.7-90-amd64.deb)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from pub.kelvpn.com, which is the official distribution host for KelVPN (a commercial VPN product). The binaries are not built from source — they are extracted and installed directly. The host appears to be the vendor's own distribution server rather than a random personal host, which reduces (but does not eliminate) supply-chain risk. The sha256 checksums provide integrity verification against tampering in transit, but there is no GPG signature verification. The core concern is that prebuilt closed-source VPN binaries with network-level access are being installed, and trust is entirely placed in the vendor's distribution infrastructure. This is a legitimate medium-risk pattern: executed proprietary binaries from a vendor-controlled but non-auditable host, with no source build and no cryptographic signature beyond checksums. Not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern for a VPN client that handles sensitive network traffic.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Mika Hyttinen <mika dot hyttinen+arch ät gmail dot com>
2pkgname=kelvpn
3pkgver=7.7.90
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Decentralized quantum-secure VPN service. It provides the highest level of protection for your network connection, including quantum threat protection."
6arch=('x86_64' 'aarch64')
7url="https://kelvpn.com/"
8license=('LicenseRef-custom')
9provides=("kelvpn")
10source_x86_64=(https://pub.kelvpn.com/linux/master/KelVPN-7.7-90-amd64.deb)
11source_aarch64=(https://pub.kelvpn.com/linux/master/KelVPN-7.7-90-arm64.deb)
12sha256sums_x86_64=('72bf88df644f97d3fdbc97f220ca5244c2e0b401271016469d86fb49d2dacbc9')
13sha256sums_aarch64=('182016ef36d2dfc4ea912178c0b8dfd5a4d440a7421a04254ce0b3c6112666b9')
14install=$pkgname.install
15options=(!debug)
16depends=(fontconfig freetype2 libgl libpng libx11 libxcb libxrandr networkmanager xcb-util-image xcb-util-keysyms xcb-util-renderutil xcb-util-wm zlib net-tools)
17
18package() {
19 bsdtar -xf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir/"
20 mkdir -p "$pkgdir"/usr/bin
21 chmod -R 755 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/bin"
22 ln -sf "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/bin/KelVPN" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/$pkgname"
23 install -Dm 644 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/share/KelVPN.desktop" -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
24 install -Dm 644 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/share/KelVPNService.service" -t "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/"
25}
26

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion