keycombiner

maintainer HIDE-r · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt AppImage binary directly from keycombiner.com (the project's own website). The domain appears to be the official vendor site matching the package URL, and a sha256sum is provided for integrity checking. However, the core concern remains: this is a closed-source, prebuilt binary (not compiled from source) that gets extracted and executed on the user's system. The AppImage is run during prepare() with --appimage-extract, and then installed and symlinked into /usr/bin for persistent execution. While the source domain matches the official project site and this is a common AUR pattern for AppImage packaging, it still represents a supply-chain risk: if keycombiner.com were compromised or the binary swapped, users would execute arbitrary code. This is a genuine medium-severity concern — not a false positive — because it involves executed binary code from a non-standard (non-GitHub/GitLab/official distro) host with no additional verification beyond a single sha256sum. It is not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or domain substitution.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 source=("${_appimage}::https://keycombiner.com/download/KeyCombiner-${pkgver}.AppImage")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads and executes a prebuilt AppImage binary directly from keycombiner.com (the project's own website). The domain appears to be the official vendor site matching the package URL, and a sha256sum is provided for integrity checking. However, the core concern remains: this is a closed-source, prebuilt binary (not compiled from source) that gets extracted and executed on the user's system. The AppImage is run during prepare() with --appimage-extract, and then installed and symlinked into /usr/bin for persistent execution. While the source domain matches the official project site and this is a common AUR pattern for AppImage packaging, it still represents a supply-chain risk: if keycombiner.com were compromised or the binary swapped, users would execute arbitrary code. This is a genuine medium-severity concern — not a false positive — because it involves executed binary code from a non-standard (non-GitHub/GitLab/official distro) host with no additional verification beyond a single sha256sum. It is not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or domain substitution.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: HIDE-r <lkangn.collin@gmail.com>
    
      2pkgname=keycombiner
    
      3pkgver=0.8.0
    
      4pkgrel=2
    
      5pkgdesc="An app to organize, learn, and practice keyboard shortcuts!"
    
      6arch=("x86_64")
    
      7url="https://keycombiner.com"
    
      8license=('custom')
    
      9options=(!strip)
    
      10depends=('fuse2')
    
      11_appimage="${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage"
    
      12source=("${_appimage}::https://keycombiner.com/download/KeyCombiner-${pkgver}.AppImage")
    
      13noextract=("${_appimage}")
    
      14sha256sums=("377348e207c5614d600ca0ca2da588fd78206ea52cd7d115d7ca0086b179bbff")
    
      15
    
      16prepare() {
    
      17    chmod +x "${_appimage}"
    
      18    ./"${_appimage}" --appimage-extract
    
      19}
    
      20
    
      21build() {
    
      22    # Fix permissions; .AppImage permissions are 700 for all directories
    
      23    chmod -R a-x+rX squashfs-root/usr
    
      24}
    
      25
    
      26package() {
    
      27    # AppImage
    
      28    install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/${_appimage}" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage"
    
      29
    
      30    # Desktop file
    
      31    install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/${pkgname}.desktop"\
    
      32            "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
    
      33
    
      34    # Icon 
    
      35    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
    
      36    cp -a "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/usr/share/icons" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
    
      37
    
      38    # Symlink executable
    
      39    install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      40    ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      41}
    
      42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2