kibo-appimage

maintainer Cleboost · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt AppImage binary from apk.kiboanime.app, which is a project-controlled but non-standard subdomain host. The AppImage is an executable binary that runs directly on the user's system (via fuse2), making it a full code-execution artifact. While sha256sums are present and verified, they only protect against transit corruption/substitution — if the upstream host (apk.kiboanime.app) were compromised or the maintainer pushed a new version without updating checksums, users would receive unvetted executable code. The domain is not a well-known, audited distribution channel (like GitHub releases or a major distro mirror). The .desktop file is pulled from a personal GitHub repo (Cleboost/missing-aur) rather than the upstream project itself, adding another trust boundary. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but a prebuilt binary from an unofficial/project-owned subdomain with no source build path.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://apk.kiboanime.app/downloadpc/Kibo-${pkgver}.AppImage"
  • PKGBUILD:13 "kibo.svg::https://www.kiboanime.app/group-2.svg"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt AppImage binary from apk.kiboanime.app, which is a project-controlled but non-standard subdomain host. The AppImage is an executable binary that runs directly on the user's system (via fuse2), making it a full code-execution artifact. While sha256sums are present and verified, they only protect against transit corruption/substitution — if the upstream host (apk.kiboanime.app) were compromised or the maintainer pushed a new version without updating checksums, users would receive unvetted executable code. The domain is not a well-known, audited distribution channel (like GitHub releases or a major distro mirror). The .desktop file is pulled from a personal GitHub repo (Cleboost/missing-aur) rather than the upstream project itself, adding another trust boundary. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but a prebuilt binary from an unofficial/project-owned subdomain with no source build path.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted
1pkgname=kibo-appimage
2pkgver=1.1.7
3pkgrel=2
4pkgdesc="Kibo Anime AppImage - Application for watching anime"
5arch=('x86_64')
6url="https://kiboanime.app"
7license=('custom')
8depends=('fuse2')
9options=(!strip)
10
11source=(
12 "${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://apk.kiboanime.app/downloadpc/Kibo-${pkgver}.AppImage"
13 "kibo.svg::https://www.kiboanime.app/group-2.svg"
14 "kibo.desktop::https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Cleboost/missing-aur/main/kibo/kibo.desktop"
15)
16
17sha256sums=('389bde34622f5b8469ad72ca7d26ff0de60012981bf9876a80cfa2c57a0a5b7d'
18 'bbe7aef71d090ed5eabc7b2933431990ce8e5253ea3123d3695cd2264434bbd6'
19 '3f3472b09fa34c77f238efa75ea8da528c969ef67e7ec062699f97f5c90533aa')
20
21prepare() {
22 chmod +x "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage"
23}
24
25package() {
26 install -Dm755 \
27 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage" \
28 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/kibo.AppImage"
29
30 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
31 ln -sf "/opt/${pkgname}/kibo.AppImage" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/kibo"
32
33 install -Dm644 \
34 "${srcdir}/kibo.svg" \
35 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/kibo.svg"
36
37 install -Dm644 \
38 "${srcdir}/kibo.desktop" \
39 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/kibo.desktop"
40
41 install -Dm644 /dev/stdin \
42 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE" <<'EOF'
43This package redistributes the Kibo Anime AppImage.
44
45Upstream project:
46https://kiboanime.app
47
48License terms and conditions are provided by the upstream project.
49EOF
50}
51

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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