kisslicer

maintainer RaidonChrome · 8 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt proprietary binaries (KISSlicer) directly from kisslicer.com and installs them as executable files. This is the official vendor website for KISSlicer, not a personal or unofficial host, so the source is as legitimate as it can be for a closed-source binary. However, the download uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the binary could be intercepted and replaced in transit (MITM attack), and the checksums only protect against accidental corruption or a compromised server — they do not protect against a MITM on an unencrypted channel. The binary itself is a closed-source executable installed to /opt and /usr/bin with no source code available for inspection. This is a classic AUR prebuilt-binary pattern: the risk is real (executed binary from a non-auditable source over plain HTTP) but not clearly malicious. Medium is the correct rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:22 source_i686=('http://www.kisslicer.com/uploads/1/5/3/8/15381852/kisslicer_linux32_1.6.3_release.zip')
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt proprietary binaries (KISSlicer) directly from kisslicer.com and installs them as executable files. This is the official vendor website for KISSlicer, not a personal or unofficial host, so the source is as legitimate as it can be for a closed-source binary. However, the download uses plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the binary could be intercepted and replaced in transit (MITM attack), and the checksums only protect against accidental corruption or a compromised server — they do not protect against a MITM on an unencrypted channel. The binary itself is a closed-source executable installed to /opt and /usr/bin with no source code available for inspection. This is a classic AUR prebuilt-binary pattern: the risk is real (executed binary from a non-auditable source over plain HTTP) but not clearly malicious. Medium is the correct rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1pkgname=kisslicer
2pkgver=1.6.3
3pkgrel=4
4pkgdesc="KISSlicer is a fast, easy-to-use, cross-platform program that takes 3D files (STL) and generates path information (G-code) for a 3D Printer. The FREE version has all the features needed for the hobbyist who uses a single-head machine."
5arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
6url="http://www.kisslicer.com/index.html"
7license=('custom')
8depends=(
9 'libx11'
10 'libgl'
11)
12
13conflicts=('kisslicer')
14provides=('kisslicer')
15
16# Sources
17source=(
18 "$pkgname.desktop"
19 "$pkgname.sh"
20 "$pkgname.png"
21)
22source_i686=('http://www.kisslicer.com/uploads/1/5/3/8/15381852/kisslicer_linux32_1.6.3_release.zip')
23source_x86_64=('http://www.kisslicer.com/uploads/1/5/3/8/15381852/kisslicer_linux64_1.6.3_release.zip')
24# Checksums
25sha256sums=('be805f3f422f9e764cb83492f9ecf4f9f854f9e6027c970baa9b6b07dfcb1d30'
26 '3708d511e97c78d78d3ba423875a03a5a808b3f0e28da620700376b84e53500a'
27 '17ec56ab667fc601b5282c8093e795cc65c6c73df25fdafd8ddd96436ea24589'
28 )
29sha256sums_i686=('50be1299bac9a55e1fb42c22b93d1978baf76a2fe976148974a3a47ae5b60c33')
30sha256sums_x86_64=('def3d429973ca5c6eeee037846369c9e30e130b968a556b7ffe59aaa4993e9ea')
31
32package() {
33
34 cd "$srcdir/"
35
36 # Creating needed directories
37 install -dm755 "$pkgdir/opt/kisslicer/"
38
39 # Program
40 install -Dm755 "$srcdir/KISSlicer" "$pkgdir/opt/kisslicer/KISSlicer"
41 install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$pkgname.png" "$pkgdir/opt/kisslicer/KISSlicer.png"
42 install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$pkgname.sh" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/$pkgname.sh"
43
44 # Desktop launcher
45 install -Dm755 "$srcdir/$pkgname.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/kisslicer.desktop"
46}
47

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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