kontur-plugin

maintainer komex · 5 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from install.kontur.ru, which is the official distribution host for SKB Kontur (a well-known Russian e-signature/crypto vendor), not a personal or random host. However, the URL is not versioned — it always fetches 'kontur.plugin_amd64.deb' without a version in the path, meaning the checksum could become stale if the file is updated upstream, and the pkgver() function extracts the version from the downloaded package itself rather than pinning it. This means the sha256sum is the only integrity check, and if the upstream file changes (intentionally or via compromise), a stale PKGBUILD would fail the checksum but a freshly updated PKGBUILD could silently deliver a new binary. The package installs a browser crypto plugin (executed native code) from a proprietary binary blob with no source code available. This is a legitimate medium-risk supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-versioned URL on a vendor-controlled host, with no source verification possible. Not clearly malicious, but the floating URL and binary-only nature are genuine concerns.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:18 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://install.kontur.ru/files/kontur.plugin_amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from install.kontur.ru, which is the official distribution host for SKB Kontur (a well-known Russian e-signature/crypto vendor), not a personal or random host. However, the URL is not versioned — it always fetches 'kontur.plugin_amd64.deb' without a version in the path, meaning the checksum could become stale if the file is updated upstream, and the pkgver() function extracts the version from the downloaded package itself rather than pinning it. This means the sha256sum is the only integrity check, and if the upstream file changes (intentionally or via compromise), a stale PKGBUILD would fail the checksum but a freshly updated PKGBUILD could silently deliver a new binary. The package installs a browser crypto plugin (executed native code) from a proprietary binary blob with no source code available. This is a legitimate medium-risk supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-versioned URL on a vendor-controlled host, with no source verification possible. Not clearly malicious, but the floating URL and binary-only nature are genuine concerns.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Lionel Miller <delonorm at gmail dot com>
2# Maintainer: Marat Talipov <t-marat.yandex.ru>
3# Maintainer: Andrey Kolchenko <andrey@kolchenko.me>
4
5pkgname=kontur-plugin
6pkgver=4.11.1.3628
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc='Kontur.Plugin is an extension for web browsers that allows users to perform cryptographic operations in SKB Kontur services.'
9arch=('x86_64')
10license=('proprietary')
11depends=(
12 'gtk3'
13 'cryptopro-csp-k1'
14 'jacartauc'
15)
16optdepends=('rutoken-connect')
17url='https://help.kontur.ru/plugin/'
18source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://install.kontur.ru/files/kontur.plugin_amd64.deb")
19sha256sums=('084f66a3592025899ff4f8c0d874e935b2d45469804812b36aae03c0337eba36')
20
21pkgver() {
22 bsdtar -xf control.tar.gz
23 grep 'Version:' control | cut -d ' ' -f 2
24}
25
26package() {
27 bsdtar -xf data.tar.gz -C "${pkgdir}/"
28 mv "${pkgdir}/lib/systemd" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib"
29 rm -r "${pkgdir}/usr/lib64/" # /usr/lib64 is a symlink to /usr/lib
30 rm -r "${pkgdir}/lib"
31}
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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