kontur-talk
The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt proprietary binary .deb package from st.ktalk.host, which is a subdomain associated with Kontur Talk (ktalk), a Russian enterprise video conferencing product by SKB Kontur. The domain is plausibly the official distribution host for this software (ktalk = Kontur Talk, st = static/storage), and the URL pattern matches what one would expect from a vendor CDN. However, it is not a well-known public forge or package registry, there is no GPG signature verification, and the only integrity check is a single sha256sum. The binary is extracted and installed directly into the system (Electron-based app given the gtk3/nss/libxtst deps). This is a classic medium-risk pattern: a closed-source prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled but unverifiable host, with no signature chain. If the host were compromised or the maintainer updates the hash to a malicious binary, arbitrary code execution would result. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern warranting medium severity.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=("https://st.ktalk.host/ktalk-app/linux/ktalk${pkgver}amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt proprietary binary .deb package from st.ktalk.host, which is a subdomain associated with Kontur Talk (ktalk), a Russian enterprise video conferencing product by SKB Kontur. The domain is plausibly the official distribution host for this software (ktalk = Kontur Talk, st = static/storage), and the URL pattern matches what one would expect from a vendor CDN. However, it is not a well-known public forge or package registry, there is no GPG signature verification, and the only integrity check is a single sha256sum. The binary is extracted and installed directly into the system (Electron-based app given the gtk3/nss/libxtst deps). This is a classic medium-risk pattern: a closed-source prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled but unverifiable host, with no signature chain. If the host were compromised or the maintainer updates the hash to a malicious binary, arbitrary code execution would result. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern warranting medium severity.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Yaroslav de la Peña Smirnov <yps@yaroslavps.com>
pkgname=kontur-talk
pkgver=3.6.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Enterprise video conferencing client app"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://kontur.ru/talk"
license=('custom')
makedepends=('wget' 'tar')
depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'libxtst' 'xdg-utils' 'util-linux-libs')
provides=('kontur-talk')
source=("https://st.ktalk.host/ktalk-app/linux/ktalk${pkgver}amd64.deb")
sha256sums=('f18196e1b5f593d1feb434873465ec326a793e1277ce396ace629664dde710ca')
package() {
ar -x "${srcdir}/ktalk${pkgver}amd64.deb" data.tar.xz
tar -xJf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |