kontur-talk
The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt proprietary binary .deb package from st.ktalk.host, which is a subdomain associated with Kontur Talk (ktalk), a Russian enterprise video conferencing product by SKB Kontur. The domain is plausibly the official distribution host for this software (ktalk = Kontur Talk, st = static/storage), and the URL pattern matches what one would expect from a vendor CDN. However, it is not a well-known public forge or package registry, there is no GPG signature verification, and the only integrity check is a single sha256sum. The binary is extracted and installed directly into the system (Electron-based app given the gtk3/nss/libxtst deps). This is a classic medium-risk pattern: a closed-source prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled but unverifiable host, with no signature chain. If the host were compromised or the maintainer updates the hash to a malicious binary, arbitrary code execution would result. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern warranting medium severity.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=("https://st.ktalk.host/ktalk-app/linux/ktalk${pkgver}amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt proprietary binary .deb package from st.ktalk.host, which is a subdomain associated with Kontur Talk (ktalk), a Russian enterprise video conferencing product by SKB Kontur. The domain is plausibly the official distribution host for this software (ktalk = Kontur Talk, st = static/storage), and the URL pattern matches what one would expect from a vendor CDN. However, it is not a well-known public forge or package registry, there is no GPG signature verification, and the only integrity check is a single sha256sum. The binary is extracted and installed directly into the system (Electron-based app given the gtk3/nss/libxtst deps). This is a classic medium-risk pattern: a closed-source prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled but unverifiable host, with no signature chain. If the host were compromised or the maintainer updates the hash to a malicious binary, arbitrary code execution would result. Not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern warranting medium severity.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Yaroslav de la Peña Smirnov <yps@yaroslavps.com>
pkgname=kontur-talk
pkgver=3.6.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Enterprise video conferencing client app"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://kontur.ru/talk"
license=('custom')
makedepends=('wget' 'tar')
depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'libxtst' 'xdg-utils' 'util-linux-libs')
provides=('kontur-talk')
source=("https://st.ktalk.host/ktalk-app/linux/ktalk${pkgver}amd64.deb")
sha256sums=('f18196e1b5f593d1feb434873465ec326a793e1277ce396ace629664dde710ca')
package() {
ar -x "${srcdir}/ktalk${pkgver}amd64.deb" data.tar.xz
tar -xJf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |