ld64
Multiple serious issues: (1) The package() function re-downloads the .deb at install time via wget from assets.checkra.in, completely bypassing the sha256sum integrity check that was performed on the source= download — the runtime wget fetch is entirely unverified. (2) It uses 'sudo cp -r usr/ /' inside the package() function, which is a severe packaging violation that directly writes files to the live root filesystem instead of into $pkgdir, bypassing pacman's package management entirely. (3) assets.checkra.in is the checkra1n jailbreak project's asset host — while not inherently malicious, it is an unofficial third-party host for a prebuilt binary (a linker, ld64) that gets executed as a system tool. The combination of: unverified runtime binary download + direct root filesystem modification via sudo makes this a genuine code-execution/supply-chain risk regardless of intent. The sha256sum on the source= entry is irrelevant since the actual installed binary comes from the second unverified wget call.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=('http://assets.checkra.in/debian/ld64_530-2_amd64.deb')
llm_review
The static rules found a suspicious pattern they could not resolve, so an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed it and judged it HIGH (confidence 92%): Multiple serious issues: (1) The package() function re-downloads the .deb at install time via wget from assets.checkra.in, completely bypassing the sha256sum integrity check that was performed on the source= download — the runtime wget fetch is entirely unverified. (2) It uses 'sudo cp -r usr/ /' inside the package() function, which is a severe packaging violation that directly writes files to the live root filesystem instead of into $pkgdir, bypassing pacman's package management entirely. (3) assets.checkra.in is the checkra1n jailbreak project's asset host — while not inherently malicious, it is an unofficial third-party host for a prebuilt binary (a linker, ld64) that gets executed as a system tool. The combination of: unverified runtime binary download + direct root filesystem modification via sudo makes this a genuine code-execution/supply-chain risk regardless of intent. The sha256sum on the source= entry is irrelevant since the actual installed binary comes from the second unverified wget call.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Alan Lutter (alan.lutter@outlook.sk)
pkgrel=0
pkgname=ld64
pkgver=530_3
pkgdesc="Apple LD64 for Arch Linux."
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://assets.checkra.in/debian"
license=('unknown')
depends=('base-devel')
makedepends=('base-devel' 'wget')
source=('http://assets.checkra.in/debian/ld64_530-2_amd64.deb')
sha256sums=('a2c017ca05d33325d4a39ba906ee2a535327d136adea5fd029fdc9407a4b7d31')
package(){
wget -q -O ld64_530-2_amd64.deb "$url/ld64_530-2_amd64.deb"
ar x ld64_530-2_amd64.deb
tar -xf data.tar.xz
sudo cp -r usr/ /
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | High | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | High | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | High | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | High | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | High | 2 |