ld64
Multiple serious issues: (1) The package() function re-downloads the .deb at install time via wget from assets.checkra.in, completely bypassing the sha256sum integrity check that was performed on the source= download — the runtime wget fetch is entirely unverified. (2) It uses 'sudo cp -r usr/ /' inside the package() function, which is a severe packaging violation that directly writes files to the live root filesystem instead of into $pkgdir, bypassing pacman's package management entirely. (3) assets.checkra.in is the checkra1n jailbreak project's asset host — while not inherently malicious, it is an unofficial third-party host for a prebuilt binary (a linker, ld64) that gets executed as a system tool. The combination of: unverified runtime binary download + direct root filesystem modification via sudo makes this a genuine code-execution/supply-chain risk regardless of intent. The sha256sum on the source= entry is irrelevant since the actual installed binary comes from the second unverified wget call.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=('http://assets.checkra.in/debian/ld64_530-2_amd64.deb')
llm_review
The static rules found a suspicious pattern they could not resolve, so an AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed it and judged it HIGH (confidence 92%): Multiple serious issues: (1) The package() function re-downloads the .deb at install time via wget from assets.checkra.in, completely bypassing the sha256sum integrity check that was performed on the source= download — the runtime wget fetch is entirely unverified. (2) It uses 'sudo cp -r usr/ /' inside the package() function, which is a severe packaging violation that directly writes files to the live root filesystem instead of into $pkgdir, bypassing pacman's package management entirely. (3) assets.checkra.in is the checkra1n jailbreak project's asset host — while not inherently malicious, it is an unofficial third-party host for a prebuilt binary (a linker, ld64) that gets executed as a system tool. The combination of: unverified runtime binary download + direct root filesystem modification via sudo makes this a genuine code-execution/supply-chain risk regardless of intent. The sha256sum on the source= entry is irrelevant since the actual installed binary comes from the second unverified wget call.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Alan Lutter (alan.lutter@outlook.sk)
pkgrel=0
pkgname=ld64
pkgver=530_3
pkgdesc="Apple LD64 for Arch Linux."
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://assets.checkra.in/debian"
license=('unknown')
depends=('base-devel')
makedepends=('base-devel' 'wget')
source=('http://assets.checkra.in/debian/ld64_530-2_amd64.deb')
sha256sums=('a2c017ca05d33325d4a39ba906ee2a535327d136adea5fd029fdc9407a4b7d31')
package(){
wget -q -O ld64_530-2_amd64.deb "$url/ld64_530-2_amd64.deb"
ar x ld64_530-2_amd64.deb
tar -xf data.tar.xz
sudo cp -r usr/ /
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | High | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | High | 2 |