lexmark_pro700
The PKGBUILD downloads a self-extracting shell script (.rpm.sh.tar.gz) from downloads.lexmark.com and executes it during prepare() with 'sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh --noexec --target'. While downloads.lexmark.com is the official Lexmark download server (a legitimate vendor host), the payload is a prebuilt binary shell-script installer that gets executed directly. The MD5 checksums provide some integrity verification, though MD5 is weak. The domain is the official Lexmark downloads subdomain, not a personal or unofficial host, which reduces the supply-chain concern somewhat. However, executing a prebuilt binary shell script installer (even with --noexec to extract rather than install) from any external host, combined with only MD5 verification, represents a genuine medium-level concern: if the upstream file were replaced or the host compromised, arbitrary code would execute during the build. This is a real but not clearly malicious supply-chain pattern — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:20
source=("http://downloads.lexmark.com/downloads/cpd/lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh.tar.gz")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 60%): The PKGBUILD downloads a self-extracting shell script (.rpm.sh.tar.gz) from downloads.lexmark.com and executes it during prepare() with 'sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh --noexec --target'. While downloads.lexmark.com is the official Lexmark download server (a legitimate vendor host), the payload is a prebuilt binary shell-script installer that gets executed directly. The MD5 checksums provide some integrity verification, though MD5 is weak. The domain is the official Lexmark downloads subdomain, not a personal or unofficial host, which reduces the supply-chain concern somewhat. However, executing a prebuilt binary shell script installer (even with --noexec to extract rather than install) from any external host, combined with only MD5 verification, represents a genuine medium-level concern: if the upstream file were replaced or the host compromised, arbitrary code would execute during the build. This is a real but not clearly malicious supply-chain pattern — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Contributor: Zeph <zeph33@gmail.com>
# For Lexmark Pro700 Series
pkgname=lexmark_pro700
pkgver=1.0
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="Lexmark Pro700 Series Printer Driver"
makedepends=('rpmextract' 'gzip' 'bash')
depends=('java-runtime' 'cups' 'libstdc++5' 'lua')
arch=('x86_64' 'i686')
license=('Freeware')
if [[ $CARCH == i686 ]]; then
_arch='i386'
md5sums=('421a5461e8cc04f1b838d23e868448fc')
else
_arch='x86_64'
md5sums=('fc421f21e50a40a4ba482c0b04f17b84')
fi
install=lexmark_pro700.install
url="http://www.lexmark.com/"
source=("http://downloads.lexmark.com/downloads/cpd/lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh.tar.gz")
prepare() {
# cd $startdir/src
# tar xf lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.x86_64.rpm.sh.tar.gz
cd ${srcdir}
sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh --noexec --target Installer-Files
cd Installer-Files
mkdir Driver
tar xvvf instarchive_all --lzma -C Driver/
cd Driver
rpmextract.sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm
rpmextract.sh lexmark-legacy-wsu-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm
}
package(){
mv -f ${srcdir}/Installer-Files/Driver/usr ${pkgdir}/
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |