lexmark_pro700

maintainer jansvendsen · 5 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a self-extracting shell script (.rpm.sh.tar.gz) from downloads.lexmark.com and executes it during prepare() with 'sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh --noexec --target'. While downloads.lexmark.com is the official Lexmark download server (a legitimate vendor host), the payload is a prebuilt binary shell-script installer that gets executed directly. The MD5 checksums provide some integrity verification, though MD5 is weak. The domain is the official Lexmark downloads subdomain, not a personal or unofficial host, which reduces the supply-chain concern somewhat. However, executing a prebuilt binary shell script installer (even with --noexec to extract rather than install) from any external host, combined with only MD5 verification, represents a genuine medium-level concern: if the upstream file were replaced or the host compromised, arbitrary code would execute during the build. This is a real but not clearly malicious supply-chain pattern — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:20 source=("http://downloads.lexmark.com/downloads/cpd/lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh.tar.gz")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 60%): The PKGBUILD downloads a self-extracting shell script (.rpm.sh.tar.gz) from downloads.lexmark.com and executes it during prepare() with 'sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh --noexec --target'. While downloads.lexmark.com is the official Lexmark download server (a legitimate vendor host), the payload is a prebuilt binary shell-script installer that gets executed directly. The MD5 checksums provide some integrity verification, though MD5 is weak. The domain is the official Lexmark downloads subdomain, not a personal or unofficial host, which reduces the supply-chain concern somewhat. However, executing a prebuilt binary shell script installer (even with --noexec to extract rather than install) from any external host, combined with only MD5 verification, represents a genuine medium-level concern: if the upstream file were replaced or the host compromised, arbitrary code would execute during the build. This is a real but not clearly malicious supply-chain pattern — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Contributor: Zeph <zeph33@gmail.com>
2# For Lexmark Pro700 Series
3pkgname=lexmark_pro700
4pkgver=1.0
5pkgrel=2
6pkgdesc="Lexmark Pro700 Series Printer Driver"
7makedepends=('rpmextract' 'gzip' 'bash')
8depends=('java-runtime' 'cups' 'libstdc++5' 'lua')
9arch=('x86_64' 'i686')
10license=('Freeware')
11if [[ $CARCH == i686 ]]; then
12 _arch='i386'
13 md5sums=('421a5461e8cc04f1b838d23e868448fc')
14else
15 _arch='x86_64'
16 md5sums=('fc421f21e50a40a4ba482c0b04f17b84')
17fi
18install=lexmark_pro700.install
19url="http://www.lexmark.com/"
20source=("http://downloads.lexmark.com/downloads/cpd/lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh.tar.gz")
21
22prepare() {
23# cd $startdir/src
24# tar xf lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.x86_64.rpm.sh.tar.gz
25 cd ${srcdir}
26 sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh --noexec --target Installer-Files
27 cd Installer-Files
28 mkdir Driver
29 tar xvvf instarchive_all --lzma -C Driver/
30 cd Driver
31 rpmextract.sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm
32 rpmextract.sh lexmark-legacy-wsu-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm
33}
34
35package(){
36 mv -f ${srcdir}/Installer-Files/Driver/usr ${pkgdir}/
37}
38

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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