lexmark_pro700
The PKGBUILD downloads a self-extracting shell script (.rpm.sh.tar.gz) from downloads.lexmark.com and executes it during prepare() with 'sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh --noexec --target'. While downloads.lexmark.com is the official Lexmark download server (a legitimate vendor host), the payload is a prebuilt binary shell-script installer that gets executed directly. The MD5 checksums provide some integrity verification, though MD5 is weak. The domain is the official Lexmark downloads subdomain, not a personal or unofficial host, which reduces the supply-chain concern somewhat. However, executing a prebuilt binary shell script installer (even with --noexec to extract rather than install) from any external host, combined with only MD5 verification, represents a genuine medium-level concern: if the upstream file were replaced or the host compromised, arbitrary code would execute during the build. This is a real but not clearly malicious supply-chain pattern — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:20
source=("http://downloads.lexmark.com/downloads/cpd/lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh.tar.gz")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 60%): The PKGBUILD downloads a self-extracting shell script (.rpm.sh.tar.gz) from downloads.lexmark.com and executes it during prepare() with 'sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh --noexec --target'. While downloads.lexmark.com is the official Lexmark download server (a legitimate vendor host), the payload is a prebuilt binary shell-script installer that gets executed directly. The MD5 checksums provide some integrity verification, though MD5 is weak. The domain is the official Lexmark downloads subdomain, not a personal or unofficial host, which reduces the supply-chain concern somewhat. However, executing a prebuilt binary shell script installer (even with --noexec to extract rather than install) from any external host, combined with only MD5 verification, represents a genuine medium-level concern: if the upstream file were replaced or the host compromised, arbitrary code would execute during the build. This is a real but not clearly malicious supply-chain pattern — consistent with a MEDIUM rating.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Contributor: Zeph <zeph33@gmail.com>
# For Lexmark Pro700 Series
pkgname=lexmark_pro700
pkgver=1.0
pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="Lexmark Pro700 Series Printer Driver"
makedepends=('rpmextract' 'gzip' 'bash')
depends=('java-runtime' 'cups' 'libstdc++5' 'lua')
arch=('x86_64' 'i686')
license=('Freeware')
if [[ $CARCH == i686 ]]; then
_arch='i386'
md5sums=('421a5461e8cc04f1b838d23e868448fc')
else
_arch='x86_64'
md5sums=('fc421f21e50a40a4ba482c0b04f17b84')
fi
install=lexmark_pro700.install
url="http://www.lexmark.com/"
source=("http://downloads.lexmark.com/downloads/cpd/lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh.tar.gz")
prepare() {
# cd $startdir/src
# tar xf lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.x86_64.rpm.sh.tar.gz
cd ${srcdir}
sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm.sh --noexec --target Installer-Files
cd Installer-Files
mkdir Driver
tar xvvf instarchive_all --lzma -C Driver/
cd Driver
rpmextract.sh lexmark-inkjet-legacy-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm
rpmextract.sh lexmark-legacy-wsu-1.0-1.${_arch}.rpm
}
package(){
mv -f ${srcdir}/Installer-Files/Driver/usr ${pkgdir}/
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |