libctl2

MEDIUM

maintainer gierens 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a source tarball from an external academic/personal host (docentes.fct.unl.pt) inside the build() function rather than via the source=() array, bypassing makepkg's checksum verification entirely. The downloaded archive is then compiled and installed as a shared library (libctl2). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no integrity check (no sha256sums/b2sums), the download happens at build time with no reproducibility guarantee, and the host is an unofficial personal/academic page rather than a canonical upstream release mirror. The compiled output is executed code installed system-wide. While the host appears to be a legitimate Portuguese university page for the actual CTL2 project, the packaging pattern is non-standard and unverifiable, which constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

Medium External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

PKGBUILD:15 wget https://docentes.fct.unl.pt/joao-lourenco/files/ctl-1.2.tgz

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a source tarball from an external academic/personal host (docentes.fct.unl.pt) inside the build() function rather than via the source=() array, bypassing makepkg's checksum verification entirely. The downloaded archive is then compiled and installed as a shared library (libctl2). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no integrity check (no sha256sums/b2sums), the download happens at build time with no reproducibility guarantee, and the host is an unofficial personal/academic page rather than a canonical upstream release mirror. The compiled output is executed code installed system-wide. While the host appears to be a legitimate Portuguese university page for the actual CTL2 project, the packaging pattern is non-standard and unverifiable, which constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Sandro-Alessio Gierens <sandro@gierens.de>
    
      2pkgname=libctl2
    
      3pkgver=1.2
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5makedepends=('base-devel')
    
      6arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
    
      7pkgdesc="CTL is a Software Transactional Memory Framework based in TL2 including new features and optimizations."
    
      8url="https://docentes.fct.unl.pt/joao-lourenco/software/ctl-consistent-software-transactonal-layer"
    
      9license=('BSD-3-Clause')
    
      10
    
      11build() {
    
      12    if [ ! -d ctl-1.2 ]; then
    
      13        rm -f ctl-1.2.tgz
    
      14        rm -rf ctl-1.2
    
      15        wget https://docentes.fct.unl.pt/joao-lourenco/files/ctl-1.2.tgz
    
      16        tar -xzf ctl-1.2.tgz
    
      17    fi
    
      18    cd ctl-1.2
    
      19    ./configure --prefix="$pkgdir/usr/local"
    
      20    make
    
      21}
    
      22
    
      23package() {
    
      24    cd ctl-1.2
    
      25    make install
    
      26}
    
      27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2