libctl2

MEDIUM

maintainer gierens 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a source tarball from an external academic/personal host (docentes.fct.unl.pt) inside the build() function rather than via the source=() array, bypassing makepkg's checksum verification entirely. The downloaded archive is then compiled and installed as a shared library (libctl2). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no integrity check (no sha256sums/b2sums), the download happens at build time with no reproducibility guarantee, and the host is an unofficial personal/academic page rather than a canonical upstream release mirror. The compiled output is executed code installed system-wide. While the host appears to be a legitimate Portuguese university page for the actual CTL2 project, the packaging pattern is non-standard and unverifiable, which constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

Medium External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

PKGBUILD:15 wget https://docentes.fct.unl.pt/joao-lourenco/files/ctl-1.2.tgz

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a source tarball from an external academic/personal host (docentes.fct.unl.pt) inside the build() function rather than via the source=() array, bypassing makepkg's checksum verification entirely. The downloaded archive is then compiled and installed as a shared library (libctl2). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no integrity check (no sha256sums/b2sums), the download happens at build time with no reproducibility guarantee, and the host is an unofficial personal/academic page rather than a canonical upstream release mirror. The compiled output is executed code installed system-wide. While the host appears to be a legitimate Portuguese university page for the actual CTL2 project, the packaging pattern is non-standard and unverifiable, which constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Sandro-Alessio Gierens <sandro@gierens.de>
    
      2pkgname=libctl2
    
      3pkgver=1.2
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5makedepends=('base-devel')
    
      6arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
    
      7pkgdesc="CTL is a Software Transactional Memory Framework based in TL2 including new features and optimizations."
    
      8url="https://docentes.fct.unl.pt/joao-lourenco/software/ctl-consistent-software-transactonal-layer"
    
      9license=('BSD-3-Clause')
    
      10
    
      11build() {
    
      12    if [ ! -d ctl-1.2 ]; then
    
      13        rm -f ctl-1.2.tgz
    
      14        rm -rf ctl-1.2
    
      15        wget https://docentes.fct.unl.pt/joao-lourenco/files/ctl-1.2.tgz
    
      16        tar -xzf ctl-1.2.tgz
    
      17    fi
    
      18    cd ctl-1.2
    
      19    ./configure --prefix="$pkgdir/usr/local"
    
      20    make
    
      21}
    
      22
    
      23package() {
    
      24    cd ctl-1.2
    
      25    make install
    
      26}
    
      27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2