libctl2

maintainer gierens · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a source tarball from an external academic/personal host (docentes.fct.unl.pt) inside the build() function rather than via the source=() array, bypassing makepkg's checksum verification entirely. The downloaded archive is then compiled and installed as a shared library (libctl2). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no integrity check (no sha256sums/b2sums), the download happens at build time with no reproducibility guarantee, and the host is an unofficial personal/academic page rather than a canonical upstream release mirror. The compiled output is executed code installed system-wide. While the host appears to be a legitimate Portuguese university page for the actual CTL2 project, the packaging pattern is non-standard and unverifiable, which constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

PKGBUILD:15 wget https://docentes.fct.unl.pt/joao-lourenco/files/ctl-1.2.tgz

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a source tarball from an external academic/personal host (docentes.fct.unl.pt) inside the build() function rather than via the source=() array, bypassing makepkg's checksum verification entirely. The downloaded archive is then compiled and installed as a shared library (libctl2). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: there is no integrity check (no sha256sums/b2sums), the download happens at build time with no reproducibility guarantee, and the host is an unofficial personal/academic page rather than a canonical upstream release mirror. The compiled output is executed code installed system-wide. While the host appears to be a legitimate Portuguese university page for the actual CTL2 project, the packaging pattern is non-standard and unverifiable, which constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Sandro-Alessio Gierens <sandro@gierens.de>
    
      2pkgname=libctl2
    
      3pkgver=1.2
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5makedepends=('base-devel')
    
      6arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
    
      7pkgdesc="CTL is a Software Transactional Memory Framework based in TL2 including new features and optimizations."
    
      8url="https://docentes.fct.unl.pt/joao-lourenco/software/ctl-consistent-software-transactonal-layer"
    
      9license=('BSD-3-Clause')
    
      10
    
      11build() {
    
      12    if [ ! -d ctl-1.2 ]; then
    
      13        rm -f ctl-1.2.tgz
    
      14        rm -rf ctl-1.2
    
      15        wget https://docentes.fct.unl.pt/joao-lourenco/files/ctl-1.2.tgz
    
      16        tar -xzf ctl-1.2.tgz
    
      17    fi
    
      18    cd ctl-1.2
    
      19    ./configure --prefix="$pkgdir/usr/local"
    
      20    make
    
      21}
    
      22
    
      23package() {
    
      24    cd ctl-1.2
    
      25    make install
    
      26}
    
      27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2