libpkcs11-dnie

maintainer ReyJamonico · 6 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from dnielectronico.es, which is the official Spanish government website for the DNIe (Documento Nacional de Identidad electrónico) electronic ID card. The host is the legitimate upstream vendor, not a random personal or unofficial host. However, the package still presents a real supply-chain concern: (1) it installs a prebuilt closed-source binary library (PKCS11) directly from a government website without any strong integrity verification — only an MD5 checksum is used, which is cryptographically weak; (2) the library is executed code (a shared library loaded into processes), not mere data; (3) there is no GPG signature verification; (4) the custom User-Agent header suggests the site may block standard download tools, which is a minor red flag for automation reliability. The source host being the official Spanish government DNIe portal significantly reduces the supply-chain risk compared to a truly unofficial host, but the use of a prebuilt binary with only MD5 verification keeps this at medium rather than clean. This is a legitimate but imperfect packaging pattern for official government software.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://www.dnielectronico.es/descargas/distribuciones_linux/libpkcs11-dnie_1.6.8_amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from dnielectronico.es, which is the official Spanish government website for the DNIe (Documento Nacional de Identidad electrónico) electronic ID card. The host is the legitimate upstream vendor, not a random personal or unofficial host. However, the package still presents a real supply-chain concern: (1) it installs a prebuilt closed-source binary library (PKCS11) directly from a government website without any strong integrity verification — only an MD5 checksum is used, which is cryptographically weak; (2) the library is executed code (a shared library loaded into processes), not mere data; (3) there is no GPG signature verification; (4) the custom User-Agent header suggests the site may block standard download tools, which is a minor red flag for automation reliability. The source host being the official Spanish government DNIe portal significantly reduces the supply-chain risk compared to a truly unofficial host, but the use of a prebuilt binary with only MD5 verification keeps this at medium rather than clean. This is a legitimate but imperfect packaging pattern for official government software.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: David < david at rjamo dot dev >
2# Contributor: Tom < reztho at archlinux dot us >
3pkgname=libpkcs11-dnie
4pkgver=1.6.8
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="PKCS11 library for DNIe"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://www.dnielectronico.es/"
9depends=('pcsclite' 'pcsc-tools' 'ccid')
10license=('custom')
11install=${pkgname}.install
12DLAGENTS=('https::/usr/bin/curl -A "Mozilla/5.0" -fLC - --retry 3 --retry-delay 3 -o %o %u')
13source=("https://www.dnielectronico.es/descargas/distribuciones_linux/libpkcs11-dnie_1.6.8_amd64.deb")
14
15package() {
16 cd "${srcdir}/"
17 tar -xJf data.tar.xz
18 mv usr "${pkgdir}/"
19}
20
21md5sums=('601422a532827319a5661d93b6b6a490')
22

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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