libps3000a
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:19
source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/${pkgname}/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from labs.picotech.com, which is PicoTech's own official Linux software repository (the vendor hosts their Linux drivers/libraries there). This is a legitimate vendor subdomain, not a random personal host. However, the package installs a prebuilt binary blob (shared library) directly from that host with only an MD5 checksum (cryptographically weak, no GPG signature verification). The binary is executed/loaded at runtime by user applications. The concerns are: (1) MD5 is insufficient for integrity verification against a determined attacker; (2) no GPG signature check; (3) the binary is not built from source. Despite labs.picotech.com being the legitimate vendor host, the lack of strong integrity verification and the nature of an executed binary library keeps this at medium rather than clean. It is not high because there is no evidence of malicious intent or source substitution — this is a standard pattern for proprietary hardware vendor libraries in the AUR.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Mikael Tillenius <mti at tillenius dot com>
pkgname=libps3000a
pkgver=2.1.54_6r2438
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="library for picotech oscilloscope 3000a series"
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://www.picotech.com/linux.html"
license=('custom')
groups=()
depends=(libusb)
optdepends=()
provides=()
conflicts=()
replaces=()
backup=()
options=(!strip)
install=
changelog=
source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/${pkgname}/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
md5sums=('16abf553eba9ecb014357c27160448a7')
package() {
tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
chmod -R go-w $pkgdir
chown -R root:root $pkgdir
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |