libps4000a
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from labs.picotech.com, which is PicoTech's own Linux software distribution subdomain (they host their Linux drivers/libraries there — it is the official vendor channel for their Linux packages, not a random personal host). The binary is a closed-source proprietary shared library that will be installed and executed on the user's system. The integrity check is only MD5 (weak, but present). The main concern is that a prebuilt, closed-source binary from a vendor subdomain is being installed without source verification, and labs.picotech.com is not a widely-known primary release domain. However, this is the actual official PicoTech Linux repository subdomain used for their Debian packages, making this more of a 'vendor binary repackaging' pattern common in AUR for hardware drivers. The risk is real but typical for proprietary hardware vendor packages — medium severity is appropriate: executed binary from a non-mainstream host with only MD5 integrity checking, but it is the legitimate vendor's distribution channel.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:19
source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/libps4000a/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from labs.picotech.com, which is PicoTech's own Linux software distribution subdomain (they host their Linux drivers/libraries there — it is the official vendor channel for their Linux packages, not a random personal host). The binary is a closed-source proprietary shared library that will be installed and executed on the user's system. The integrity check is only MD5 (weak, but present). The main concern is that a prebuilt, closed-source binary from a vendor subdomain is being installed without source verification, and labs.picotech.com is not a widely-known primary release domain. However, this is the actual official PicoTech Linux repository subdomain used for their Debian packages, making this more of a 'vendor binary repackaging' pattern common in AUR for hardware drivers. The risk is real but typical for proprietary hardware vendor packages — medium severity is appropriate: executed binary from a non-mainstream host with only MD5 integrity checking, but it is the legitimate vendor's distribution channel.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Mikael Tillenius <mti at tillenius dot com>
pkgname=libps4000a
pkgver=2.1.34_2r2014
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="library for picotech oscilloscope 4000a series (4824)"
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://www.picotech.com/linux.html"
license=('custom')
groups=()
depends=(libusb)
optdepends=()
provides=()
conflicts=()
replaces=()
backup=()
options=(!strip)
install=
changelog=
source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/libps4000a/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
md5sums=('faf0a722a0ab3bb4f8cf40cb090152fc')
package() {
tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
chmod -R go-w $pkgdir
chown -R root:root $pkgdir
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |