libps5000
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from labs.picotech.com, which is PicoTech's own official Linux software repository (they publish their Linux drivers/libraries there). The host is not a random personal server — it is the vendor's official Linux package distribution subdomain. However, the package installs a prebuilt closed-source binary library directly from a vendor subdomain without GPG/signature verification (only an MD5 checksum, which is weak), and the package() function extracts and installs the binary without any integrity chain beyond that MD5. This is a real but modest supply-chain concern: if labs.picotech.com were compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would need to be updated to detect it. The use of a vendor subdomain rather than a personal host reduces the risk compared to a truly unofficial source, but the lack of strong cryptographic verification of an executed binary keeps this at medium rather than clean.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:19
source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/libps5000/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from labs.picotech.com, which is PicoTech's own official Linux software repository (they publish their Linux drivers/libraries there). The host is not a random personal server — it is the vendor's official Linux package distribution subdomain. However, the package installs a prebuilt closed-source binary library directly from a vendor subdomain without GPG/signature verification (only an MD5 checksum, which is weak), and the package() function extracts and installs the binary without any integrity chain beyond that MD5. This is a real but modest supply-chain concern: if labs.picotech.com were compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would need to be updated to detect it. The use of a vendor subdomain rather than a personal host reduces the risk compared to a truly unofficial source, but the lack of strong cryptographic verification of an executed binary keeps this at medium rather than clean.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Mikael Tillenius <mti at tillenius dot com>
pkgname=libps5000
pkgver=2.1.54_3r2438
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="library for picotech oscilloscope 5000 series (5203, 5204)"
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://www.picotech.com/linux.html"
license=('custom')
groups=()
depends=(libusb)
optdepends=()
provides=()
conflicts=()
replaces=()
backup=()
options=(!strip)
install=
changelog=
source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/libps5000/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
md5sums=('18c95a8bb1dec0753481974c84889b9b')
package() {
tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
chmod -R go-w $pkgdir
chown -R root:root $pkgdir
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |