libps5000
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from labs.picotech.com, which is PicoTech's own official Linux software repository (they publish their Linux drivers/libraries there). The host is not a random personal server — it is the vendor's official Linux package distribution subdomain. However, the package installs a prebuilt closed-source binary library directly from a vendor subdomain without GPG/signature verification (only an MD5 checksum, which is weak), and the package() function extracts and installs the binary without any integrity chain beyond that MD5. This is a real but modest supply-chain concern: if labs.picotech.com were compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would need to be updated to detect it. The use of a vendor subdomain rather than a personal host reduces the risk compared to a truly unofficial source, but the lack of strong cryptographic verification of an executed binary keeps this at medium rather than clean.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:19
source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/libps5000/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from labs.picotech.com, which is PicoTech's own official Linux software repository (they publish their Linux drivers/libraries there). The host is not a random personal server — it is the vendor's official Linux package distribution subdomain. However, the package installs a prebuilt closed-source binary library directly from a vendor subdomain without GPG/signature verification (only an MD5 checksum, which is weak), and the package() function extracts and installs the binary without any integrity chain beyond that MD5. This is a real but modest supply-chain concern: if labs.picotech.com were compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would need to be updated to detect it. The use of a vendor subdomain rather than a personal host reduces the risk compared to a truly unofficial source, but the lack of strong cryptographic verification of an executed binary keeps this at medium rather than clean.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Mikael Tillenius <mti at tillenius dot com>
pkgname=libps5000
pkgver=2.1.54_3r2438
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="library for picotech oscilloscope 5000 series (5203, 5204)"
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://www.picotech.com/linux.html"
license=('custom')
groups=()
depends=(libusb)
optdepends=()
provides=()
conflicts=()
replaces=()
backup=()
options=(!strip)
install=
changelog=
source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/libps5000/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
md5sums=('18c95a8bb1dec0753481974c84889b9b')
package() {
tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
chmod -R go-w $pkgdir
chown -R root:root $pkgdir
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |