libps5000

maintainer mti · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from labs.picotech.com, which is PicoTech's own official Linux software repository (they publish their Linux drivers/libraries there). The host is not a random personal server — it is the vendor's official Linux package distribution subdomain. However, the package installs a prebuilt closed-source binary library directly from a vendor subdomain without GPG/signature verification (only an MD5 checksum, which is weak), and the package() function extracts and installs the binary without any integrity chain beyond that MD5. This is a real but modest supply-chain concern: if labs.picotech.com were compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would need to be updated to detect it. The use of a vendor subdomain rather than a personal host reduces the risk compared to a truly unofficial source, but the lack of strong cryptographic verification of an executed binary keeps this at medium rather than clean.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:19 source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/libps5000/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary Debian package (.deb) from labs.picotech.com, which is PicoTech's own official Linux software repository (they publish their Linux drivers/libraries there). The host is not a random personal server — it is the vendor's official Linux package distribution subdomain. However, the package installs a prebuilt closed-source binary library directly from a vendor subdomain without GPG/signature verification (only an MD5 checksum, which is weak), and the package() function extracts and installs the binary without any integrity chain beyond that MD5. This is a real but modest supply-chain concern: if labs.picotech.com were compromised or the file silently replaced, the MD5 would need to be updated to detect it. The use of a vendor subdomain rather than a personal host reduces the risk compared to a truly unofficial source, but the lack of strong cryptographic verification of an executed binary keeps this at medium rather than clean.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Mikael Tillenius <mti at tillenius dot com>
2pkgname=libps5000
3pkgver=2.1.54_3r2438
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="library for picotech oscilloscope 5000 series (5203, 5204)"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="http://www.picotech.com/linux.html"
8license=('custom')
9groups=()
10depends=(libusb)
11optdepends=()
12provides=()
13conflicts=()
14replaces=()
15backup=()
16options=(!strip)
17install=
18changelog=
19source=("http://labs.picotech.com/debian/pool/main/libp/libps5000/${pkgname}_${pkgver//_/-}_amd64.deb")
20md5sums=('18c95a8bb1dec0753481974c84889b9b')
21
22package() {
23 tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
24 chmod -R go-w $pkgdir
25 chown -R root:root $pkgdir
26}
27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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