libvppinfra-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer Tim_Paik 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from packagecloud.io (a legitimate third-party package hosting service used by many open-source projects including fd.io/VPP for their official releases). The SHA256 checksum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. However, the concern is real: this is a prebuilt binary extracted and installed directly, sourced from a CDN/hosting service rather than built from source. packagecloud.io is a legitimate hosting platform and fd.io does officially publish VPP packages there, so this is not an unofficial or personal host — it is the project's official distribution channel for Ubuntu packages. The risk is lower than a truly unofficial host, but installing prebuilt binaries (shared libraries from libvppinfra) that will be loaded into processes is a genuine supply-chain concern if the upstream host or account were ever compromised. The pinned checksum provides meaningful protection. Overall this sits at the lower end of medium: it's a prebuilt binary from an official but indirect distribution channel with a checksum, not clearly malicious but not source-built either.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.deb::https://packagecloud.io/fdio/release/packages/ubuntu/bionic/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}-release_amd64.deb/download.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from packagecloud.io (a legitimate third-party package hosting service used by many open-source projects including fd.io/VPP for their official releases). The SHA256 checksum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks. However, the concern is real: this is a prebuilt binary extracted and installed directly, sourced from a CDN/hosting service rather than built from source. packagecloud.io is a legitimate hosting platform and fd.io does officially publish VPP packages there, so this is not an unofficial or personal host — it is the project's official distribution channel for Ubuntu packages. The risk is lower than a truly unofficial host, but installing prebuilt binaries (shared libraries from libvppinfra) that will be loaded into processes is a genuine supply-chain concern if the upstream host or account were ever compromised. The pinned checksum provides meaningful protection. Overall this sits at the lower end of medium: it's a prebuilt binary from an official but indirect distribution channel with a checksum, not clearly malicious but not source-built either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Tim Paik <timpaik@163.com>
2
3_pkgname='libvppinfra'
4pkgname="$_pkgname-bin"
5pkgver=21.10.1
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="Vector Packet Processing -- runtime libraries"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://fd.io/"
10license=('Apache')
11depends=()
12provides=("${_pkgname}")
13source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.deb::https://packagecloud.io/fdio/release/packages/ubuntu/bionic/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}-release_amd64.deb/download.deb")
14noextract=("$pkgname-$pkgver.deb")
15sha256sums=('b5431cc9e962c16665b7c1c5cdb7af3d996af28c85ef72ffd38dab0edb001400')
16
17package() {
18 bsdtar -O -xf $pkgname-$pkgver.deb data.tar.xz | bsdtar -C "$pkgdir" -xJf -
19 for file in $(find ${pkgdir}/usr/lib -type f -or -type l -and -name \*); do
20 mv ${file} ${pkgdir}/usr/lib
21 done
22 rmdir "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu"
23}
24

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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