libxalan-c111

maintainer grega · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Debian binary (.deb) containing shared libraries (libxalan-c.so.111, libxalanMsg.so.111) from a third-party Ubuntu mirror (si.mirror.kumi.systems) rather than from the official Ubuntu archive or the upstream Apache project. These shared libraries are then installed directly into the system library path and will be loaded by other applications at runtime. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but the trust anchor is a community mirror rather than an official source. The kumi.systems mirror is a known community mirror network, not an official Ubuntu mirror, so there is a non-trivial supply-chain risk if the mirror is compromised or the file is silently replaced. A better approach would be to source from packages.ubuntu.com or build from source. This is a genuine medium-severity concern: executed/loaded binary code from a non-official host, not clearly malicious but representing a real supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=(http://si.mirror.kumi.systems/ubuntu/pool/universe/x/xalan/${pkgname}_${pkgver}-6ubuntu3_amd64.deb)
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Debian binary (.deb) containing shared libraries (libxalan-c.so.111, libxalanMsg.so.111) from a third-party Ubuntu mirror (si.mirror.kumi.systems) rather than from the official Ubuntu archive or the upstream Apache project. These shared libraries are then installed directly into the system library path and will be loaded by other applications at runtime. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but the trust anchor is a community mirror rather than an official source. The kumi.systems mirror is a known community mirror network, not an official Ubuntu mirror, so there is a non-trivial supply-chain risk if the mirror is compromised or the file is silently replaced. A better approach would be to source from packages.ubuntu.com or build from source. This is a genuine medium-severity concern: executed/loaded binary code from a non-official host, not clearly malicious but representing a real supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Grega Vrbančič <grega.vrbancic@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=libxalan-c111
4pkgver=1.11
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="XSLT processor library for C++"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://xalan.apache.org/xalan-c/"
9license=('Apache-2.0')
10depends=('glibc' 'xerces-c')
11makedepends=()
12provides=()
13source=(http://si.mirror.kumi.systems/ubuntu/pool/universe/x/xalan/${pkgname}_${pkgver}-6ubuntu3_amd64.deb)
14sha256sums=('b354e41f938c2b3181f99671c788493a66d0059efb996666c246281da21c4371')
15
16package() {
17 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/lib/
18 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/share
19 tar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz"
20 cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxalan-c.so.111.0" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/"
21 cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxalan-c.so.111" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/"
22 cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxalanMsg.so.111.0" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/"
23 cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libxalanMsg.so.111" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/"
24 cp -r "${srcdir}/usr/share/." "${pkgdir}/usr/share/"
25}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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