libximc7

MEDIUM
maintainer vitkorob 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from download.ximc.ru, which is the official download server for XIMC (a Russian motion control hardware vendor, Standa/XIMC). The domain is the vendor's own distribution host, not a random personal server. However, the connection is plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the download is vulnerable to MITM substitution of the binary despite the sha256sums providing post-download integrity verification. The package installs a shared library (libximc7) that will be loaded into user processes, so a compromised or substituted binary would result in code execution. There is no source build — only prebuilt binaries are distributed. The combination of: (1) prebuilt binary shared library, (2) plain HTTP transport (no TLS), and (3) no source availability constitutes a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern. The checksums mitigate the MITM risk somewhat, but only if the PKGBUILD itself has not been tampered with. This is a legitimate vendor package distributed in an insecure manner, not clearly malicious, which fits the medium classification.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source_i686=("http://download.ximc.ru/libximc7/libximc7-${pkgver}-i386.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from download.ximc.ru, which is the official download server for XIMC (a Russian motion control hardware vendor, Standa/XIMC). The domain is the vendor's own distribution host, not a random personal server. However, the connection is plain HTTP (not HTTPS), meaning the download is vulnerable to MITM substitution of the binary despite the sha256sums providing post-download integrity verification. The package installs a shared library (libximc7) that will be loaded into user processes, so a compromised or substituted binary would result in code execution. There is no source build — only prebuilt binaries are distributed. The combination of: (1) prebuilt binary shared library, (2) plain HTTP transport (no TLS), and (3) no source availability constitutes a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern. The checksums mitigate the MITM risk somewhat, but only if the PKGBUILD itself has not been tampered with. This is a legitimate vendor package distributed in an insecure manner, not clearly malicious, which fits the medium classification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1pkgname=libximc7
2pkgver=2.9.7
3pkgrel=1
4pkgdesc="Library for controlling stepper and other motors.
5It provides a simple C interface for controlling and configuring engine and controller.
6It uses a common virtual serial port driver embedded in all OS."
7arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
8url="https://en.xisupport.com/projects/enxisupport/wiki/Software"
9depends=('glibc>=2.14')
10license=('custom')
11source_i686=("http://download.ximc.ru/libximc7/libximc7-${pkgver}-i386.deb")
12sha256sums_i686=('68eebf7075ce5466a4db4d522d555aa9f832ad44a0322af3c999931df31caff0')
13source_x86_64=("http://download.ximc.ru/libximc7/libximc7-${pkgver}-amd64.deb")
14sha256sums_x86_64=('fb69f4cedfc165e6e6f8101933d74fb5058a10c9ae7751b49ba444b0fe764bbc')
15
16package() {
17 cd "${srcdir}"
18
19 tar -xzC "${pkgdir}" -f data.tar.gz
20
21 cp -r ${pkgdir}/lib ${pkgdir}/usr/
22 rm -r ${pkgdir}/lib
23}
24

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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