lidarview

maintainer DWestCoast · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from Google Drive (drive.usercontent.google.com) and installs it directly under /opt. Google Drive is not a canonical release host — the file can be replaced by the Drive account owner at any time without changing the URL, and the sha256sum provided (which appears to be 63 hex chars, one short of a valid SHA-256) offers weak integrity assurance. The upstream project (Kitware/LidarView on GitLab) does host official releases, but this PKGBUILD pulls from a personal/unofficial Google Drive share rather than the GitLab release assets. Installing an unverified prebuilt binary that runs as the user constitutes a real supply-chain risk. The SVG icon uses SKIP for its checksum, which is minor. Overall this is a genuine medium: executed binary from an unofficial/swappable host with questionable integrity verification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:17 source=("${_archive}-Linux.tar.gz::https://drive.usercontent.google.com/download?id=${_gdrive_id}&export=download&confirm=t"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from Google Drive (drive.usercontent.google.com) and installs it directly under /opt. Google Drive is not a canonical release host — the file can be replaced by the Drive account owner at any time without changing the URL, and the sha256sum provided (which appears to be 63 hex chars, one short of a valid SHA-256) offers weak integrity assurance. The upstream project (Kitware/LidarView on GitLab) does host official releases, but this PKGBUILD pulls from a personal/unofficial Google Drive share rather than the GitLab release assets. Installing an unverified prebuilt binary that runs as the user constitutes a real supply-chain risk. The SVG icon uses SKIP for its checksum, which is minor. Overall this is a genuine medium: executed binary from an unofficial/swappable host with questionable integrity verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Dmitry Golgowski <d.westcoast@aol.com>
2
3pkgname=lidarview
4pkgver=5.2.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Real-time reception, recording, visualization and processing of 3D LiDAR data (successor to VeloView)"
7arch=(x86_64)
8license=(Apache-2.0)
9url="https://lidarview.kitware.com"
10depends=('libglvnd' 'libxcb' 'libxkbcommon' 'dbus')
11makedepends=(gendesk)
12optdepends=('nvidia-utils: NVIDIA GPU acceleration')
13# Upstream hosts binaries on Google Drive
14# Release page: https://gitlab.kitware.com/LidarView/lidarview/-/releases
15_gdrive_id=1T2-e2nACjePKYZZpS1ds-K1t_rhMjhZA
16_archive="LidarView-${pkgver}"
17source=("${_archive}-Linux.tar.gz::https://drive.usercontent.google.com/download?id=${_gdrive_id}&export=download&confirm=t"
18 "lidarview.svg::https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kitware/LidarView/master/Application/Client/Resources/Images/LidarViewLogo.svg")
19sha256sums=('b1747057eef17c0569aa76a21433aea09446202128221c5399b6fa79f2da9e13'
20 'SKIP')
21
22prepare() {
23 gendesk --pkgname=LidarView --pkgdesc="$pkgdesc" --exec=/opt/lidarview/bin/LidarView --categories="Science;DataVisualization" PKGBUILD
24}
25
26package() {
27 install -dm755 "$pkgdir"/opt/lidarview
28 cp -a --no-preserve=ownership "$srcdir"/${_archive}/{bin,lib,plugins,share} "$pkgdir"/opt/lidarview/
29
30 install -dm755 "$pkgdir"/usr/bin
31 ln -s /opt/lidarview/bin/LidarView "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/lidarview
32 ln -s /opt/lidarview/bin/PacketFileSender "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/lidarview-packetsender
33
34 install -Dm644 "$srcdir"/LidarView.desktop -t "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications
35 install -Dm644 "$srcdir"/lidarview.svg "$pkgdir"/usr/share/pixmaps/LidarView.svg
36}
37

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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