lines
This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary (Electron-based IDE) directly from the vendor's own website (creatixbih.com), which is the official upstream host for the 'Lines' code editor. The binary is installed to /opt and symlinked into /usr/bin, meaning it executes with user privileges. The concern is that creatixbih.com is a small, relatively obscure vendor site rather than a well-known release platform (GitHub releases, official distro mirrors, etc.), and the zip is fetched without version pinning in the URL (lines_linux_x64.zip could be silently replaced). However, a sha256sum is present, which mitigates silent replacement for the specific version pinned. The real residual risk is that this is an opaque prebuilt binary from a low-profile vendor with no source code available for audit, and the URL does not embed the version number, making future updates potentially ambiguous. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal vendor host, partially mitigated by the checksum.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.zip::https://www.creatixbih.com/dl/files/lines_linux_x64.zip")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary (Electron-based IDE) directly from the vendor's own website (creatixbih.com), which is the official upstream host for the 'Lines' code editor. The binary is installed to /opt and symlinked into /usr/bin, meaning it executes with user privileges. The concern is that creatixbih.com is a small, relatively obscure vendor site rather than a well-known release platform (GitHub releases, official distro mirrors, etc.), and the zip is fetched without version pinning in the URL (lines_linux_x64.zip could be silently replaced). However, a sha256sum is present, which mitigates silent replacement for the specific version pinned. The real residual risk is that this is an opaque prebuilt binary from a low-profile vendor with no source code available for audit, and the URL does not embed the version number, making future updates potentially ambiguous. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal vendor host, partially mitigated by the checksum.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Luis Martinez <luis dot martinez at tuta dot io>
# Contributor: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
pkgname=lines
pkgver=5.2
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='A modern and minimalist IDE supporting over 150 programming languages'
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://www.creatixbih.com/lines"
license=('custom:freeware')
provides=('lines-code-editor')
depends=('gtk3' 'libxss' 'nss')
makedepends=('gendesk')
source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.zip::https://www.creatixbih.com/dl/files/lines_linux_x64.zip")
sha256sums=('e12963bbc1c7ee1d99c6d463ae55572978b7d81abdbcef056eeb8af98c2bef0e')
package() {
install -d "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/"
cp -a --no-preserve=ownership Lines/* "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/"
ln -s /opt/lines/lines "$pkgdir/usr/bin/lines"
install -Dm 644 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/app/license.txt" -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/"
install -Dm 644 "$pkgdir/opt/lines/app/res/lines.png" -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/icons/hicolor/256x256/apps/"
gendesk -f -n --pkgname "$pkgname" \
--pkgdesc "$pkgdesc" \
--name "Lines" \
--genericname "Text Editor" \
--comment "$pkgname" \
--exec "$pkgname" \
--categories "Utility;Development;IDE"
install -Dm 644 "$pkgname.desktop" -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
}
# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |