lines

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary (Electron-based IDE) directly from the vendor's own website (creatixbih.com), which is the official upstream host for the 'Lines' code editor. The binary is installed to /opt and symlinked into /usr/bin, meaning it executes with user privileges. The concern is that creatixbih.com is a small, relatively obscure vendor site rather than a well-known release platform (GitHub releases, official distro mirrors, etc.), and the zip is fetched without version pinning in the URL (lines_linux_x64.zip could be silently replaced). However, a sha256sum is present, which mitigates silent replacement for the specific version pinned. The real residual risk is that this is an opaque prebuilt binary from a low-profile vendor with no source code available for audit, and the URL does not embed the version number, making future updates potentially ambiguous. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal vendor host, partially mitigated by the checksum.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.zip::https://www.creatixbih.com/dl/files/lines_linux_x64.zip")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary (Electron-based IDE) directly from the vendor's own website (creatixbih.com), which is the official upstream host for the 'Lines' code editor. The binary is installed to /opt and symlinked into /usr/bin, meaning it executes with user privileges. The concern is that creatixbih.com is a small, relatively obscure vendor site rather than a well-known release platform (GitHub releases, official distro mirrors, etc.), and the zip is fetched without version pinning in the URL (lines_linux_x64.zip could be silently replaced). However, a sha256sum is present, which mitigates silent replacement for the specific version pinned. The real residual risk is that this is an opaque prebuilt binary from a low-profile vendor with no source code available for audit, and the URL does not embed the version number, making future updates potentially ambiguous. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal vendor host, partially mitigated by the checksum.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Luis Martinez <luis dot martinez at tuta dot io>
2# Contributor: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
3
4pkgname=lines
5pkgver=5.2
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc='A modern and minimalist IDE supporting over 150 programming languages'
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://www.creatixbih.com/lines"
10license=('custom:freeware')
11provides=('lines-code-editor')
12depends=('gtk3' 'libxss' 'nss')
13makedepends=('gendesk')
14source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.zip::https://www.creatixbih.com/dl/files/lines_linux_x64.zip")
15sha256sums=('e12963bbc1c7ee1d99c6d463ae55572978b7d81abdbcef056eeb8af98c2bef0e')
16
17package() {
18 install -d "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/"
19 cp -a --no-preserve=ownership Lines/* "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/"
20 ln -s /opt/lines/lines "$pkgdir/usr/bin/lines"
21 install -Dm 644 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/app/license.txt" -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/"
22 install -Dm 644 "$pkgdir/opt/lines/app/res/lines.png" -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/icons/hicolor/256x256/apps/"
23 gendesk -f -n --pkgname "$pkgname" \
24 --pkgdesc "$pkgdesc" \
25 --name "Lines" \
26 --genericname "Text Editor" \
27 --comment "$pkgname" \
28 --exec "$pkgname" \
29 --categories "Utility;Development;IDE"
30 install -Dm 644 "$pkgname.desktop" -t "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/"
31}
32
33# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
34

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion