lingma-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from an Aliyun OSS bucket (lingma-ide.oss-rg-china-mainland.aliyuncs.com) which is plausibly the official vendor host for Alibaba's Lingma IDE product (lingma.aliyun.com is the official URL). However, two real concerns remain: (1) the source URL points to a 'latest' rolling artifact rather than a versioned/pinned release, meaning the downloaded binary can change at any time without the PKGBUILD being updated; (2) sha256sums is set to 'SKIP', so there is zero integrity verification of the downloaded executable. Together these mean any compromise or silent replacement of the OSS-hosted binary would go undetected. The host itself is consistent with an official Alibaba/Aliyun product distribution channel, so this is not clearly malicious, but the combination of an executed binary + no checksum + mutable 'latest' URL constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk warranting a medium rating.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:15
source=("lingma_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://lingma-ide.oss-rg-china-mainland.aliyuncs.com/release/latest/lingma_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from an Aliyun OSS bucket (lingma-ide.oss-rg-china-mainland.aliyuncs.com) which is plausibly the official vendor host for Alibaba's Lingma IDE product (lingma.aliyun.com is the official URL). However, two real concerns remain: (1) the source URL points to a 'latest' rolling artifact rather than a versioned/pinned release, meaning the downloaded binary can change at any time without the PKGBUILD being updated; (2) sha256sums is set to 'SKIP', so there is zero integrity verification of the downloaded executable. Together these mean any compromise or silent replacement of the OSS-hosted binary would go undetected. The host itself is consistent with an official Alibaba/Aliyun product distribution channel, so this is not clearly malicious, but the combination of an executed binary + no checksum + mutable 'latest' URL constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk warranting a medium rating.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: wildkid1024 <wildkid1024 at outlook dot com>
pkgname=lingma-bin
pkgver=0.11.0
pkgrel=4
pkgdesc="Lingma IDE 灵码编辑器 - Binary Version"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://lingma.aliyun.com/"
license=('custom')
depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'alsa-lib' 'libxss' 'libxtst' 'mesa')
provides=('lingma' 'lingma-ide')
conflicts=('lingma' 'lingma-ide')
options=(!strip)
# 已替换为你提供的最新下载链接
source=("lingma_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://lingma-ide.oss-rg-china-mainland.aliyuncs.com/release/latest/lingma_amd64.deb")
# 清空校验和(使用 latest 链接会自动更新文件,需要重新生成校验和)
sha256sums=('SKIP')
package() {
bsdtar -xOf "lingma_${pkgver}_amd64.deb" data.tar.xz | bsdtar -xJf - -C "${pkgdir}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |