lingma-bin

maintainer wildkid1024 · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from an Aliyun OSS bucket (lingma-ide.oss-rg-china-mainland.aliyuncs.com) which is plausibly the official vendor host for Alibaba's Lingma IDE product (lingma.aliyun.com is the official URL). However, two real concerns remain: (1) the source URL points to a 'latest' rolling artifact rather than a versioned/pinned release, meaning the downloaded binary can change at any time without the PKGBUILD being updated; (2) sha256sums is set to 'SKIP', so there is zero integrity verification of the downloaded executable. Together these mean any compromise or silent replacement of the OSS-hosted binary would go undetected. The host itself is consistent with an official Alibaba/Aliyun product distribution channel, so this is not clearly malicious, but the combination of an executed binary + no checksum + mutable 'latest' URL constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk warranting a medium rating.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source=("lingma_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://lingma-ide.oss-rg-china-mainland.aliyuncs.com/release/latest/lingma_amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from an Aliyun OSS bucket (lingma-ide.oss-rg-china-mainland.aliyuncs.com) which is plausibly the official vendor host for Alibaba's Lingma IDE product (lingma.aliyun.com is the official URL). However, two real concerns remain: (1) the source URL points to a 'latest' rolling artifact rather than a versioned/pinned release, meaning the downloaded binary can change at any time without the PKGBUILD being updated; (2) sha256sums is set to 'SKIP', so there is zero integrity verification of the downloaded executable. Together these mean any compromise or silent replacement of the OSS-hosted binary would go undetected. The host itself is consistent with an official Alibaba/Aliyun product distribution channel, so this is not clearly malicious, but the combination of an executed binary + no checksum + mutable 'latest' URL constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk warranting a medium rating.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: wildkid1024 <wildkid1024 at outlook dot com>
2pkgname=lingma-bin
3pkgver=0.11.0
4pkgrel=4
5pkgdesc="Lingma IDE 灵码编辑器 - Binary Version"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://lingma.aliyun.com/"
8license=('custom')
9depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'alsa-lib' 'libxss' 'libxtst' 'mesa')
10provides=('lingma' 'lingma-ide')
11conflicts=('lingma' 'lingma-ide')
12options=(!strip)
13
14# 已替换为你提供的最新下载链接
15source=("lingma_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://lingma-ide.oss-rg-china-mainland.aliyuncs.com/release/latest/lingma_amd64.deb")
16
17# 清空校验和(使用 latest 链接会自动更新文件,需要重新生成校验和)
18sha256sums=('SKIP')
19
20package() {
21 bsdtar -xOf "lingma_${pkgver}_amd64.deb" data.tar.xz | bsdtar -xJf - -C "${pkgdir}"
22}
23

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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