localxpose-gui

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from a DigitalOcean Spaces bucket (lxpdownloads.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com) with sha256sums='SKIP', then executes it during the build phase (--appimage-extract) and installs the extracted contents system-wide. The host is a vendor-controlled CDN bucket rather than a well-known official release host (e.g. GitHub releases), and the skipped checksum means any substitution of the binary would go undetected. The AppImage is executed code, not data, so this is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the bucket were compromised or the URL silently redirected, arbitrary code would run on the builder's machine and be installed system-wide. The pkgver='latest' floating version compounds this by making reproducibility impossible. This matches the classic medium pattern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no integrity verification.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://lxpdownloads.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/gui/LocalXpose-linux-amd64.AppImage"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from a DigitalOcean Spaces bucket (lxpdownloads.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com) with sha256sums='SKIP', then executes it during the build phase (--appimage-extract) and installs the extracted contents system-wide. The host is a vendor-controlled CDN bucket rather than a well-known official release host (e.g. GitHub releases), and the skipped checksum means any substitution of the binary would go undetected. The AppImage is executed code, not data, so this is a genuine supply-chain concern: if the bucket were compromised or the URL silently redirected, arbitrary code would run on the builder's machine and be installed system-wide. The pkgver='latest' floating version compounds this by making reproducibility impossible. This matches the classic medium pattern: executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no integrity verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer:  Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=localxpose-gui
    
      4pkgver=latest
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="A reverse proxy that enables you to expose your localhost to the internet"
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url='https://localxpose.io'
    
      9license=("custom:${pkgname}")
    
      10provides=('localxpose')
    
      11makedepends=('gendesk')
    
      12options=('!strip')
    
      13noextract=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage")
    
      14source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://lxpdownloads.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/gui/LocalXpose-linux-amd64.AppImage"
    
      15        'LICENSE')
    
      16sha256sums=('SKIP'
    
      17            'SKIP')
    
      18
    
      19package() {
    
      20  chmod 755 ./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage
    
      21  ./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage --appimage-extract
    
      22  install -Dm644 squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/256x256/apps/localxpose.png "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/localxpose-gui.png"
    
      23  gendesk -f -n --pkgname "${pkgname}" \
    
      24          --pkgdesc "$pkgdesc" \
    
      25          --name "LocalXpose" \
    
      26          --comment "$pkgdesc" \
    
      27          --exec "${pkgname}" \
    
      28          --categories 'Network;Application;' \
    
      29          --icon "${pkgname}"
    
      30  install -Dm644 "${pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
    
      31  install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      32  install -d "${pkgdir}/opt"
    
      33  cp -avR squashfs-root/ "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
    
      34  ln -s /opt/${pkgname}/AppRun "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      35  find "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}" -type d -exec chmod 755 {} +
    
      36  find "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}" -type f -exec chmod o-w {} +
    
      37  install -Dm644 LICENSE -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
    
      38}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2