lockit
The source is a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.xz) fetched from a personal/unofficial domain (software.concise.cc) rather than from the project's official GitLab repository (gitlab.com/a4to/lockit). While the maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), this is still a personal host, not the upstream project's official release infrastructure. The package installs executables directly from this prebuilt artifact (install -Dm755 usr/bin/*), meaning any compromise or silent substitution of the hosted file would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system. A sha512sum and a PGP key are present, which mitigates but does not eliminate the risk — the PGP key's trustworthiness cannot be independently verified without checking it against a well-known keyserver and the upstream project. The correct rating is MEDIUM: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-official personal host) that is not clearly malicious.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
"https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The source is a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.xz) fetched from a personal/unofficial domain (software.concise.cc) rather than from the project's official GitLab repository (gitlab.com/a4to/lockit). While the maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), this is still a personal host, not the upstream project's official release infrastructure. The package installs executables directly from this prebuilt artifact (install -Dm755 usr/bin/*), meaning any compromise or silent substitution of the hosted file would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system. A sha512sum and a PGP key are present, which mitigates but does not eliminate the risk — the PGP key's trustworthiness cannot be independently verified without checking it against a well-known keyserver and the upstream project. The correct rating is MEDIUM: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-official personal host) that is not clearly malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
# ---
pkgname=lockit
pkgver=0.1.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Simple script that makes use of GPG to encrypt and decrypt files and folders"
arch=(x86_64)
url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
license=('MIT')
depends=(gnupg dialog)
source=(
"https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
)
sha512sums=(
'ac5824c525bea22a21a9a5b6adacdd94a98ef641958c108ac9f1fc66c2682e7a7bdb5e6b64c81b99e084b339d6969d01cfa586452abf0cf51be7692ac6e29ff7'
)
md5sums=(
'2b3055843a3c812ddf195f8d1e45288f'
)
validpgpkeys=(
'81BACEEBC3EA26E127166E4A819BB92A9A48160E'
)
package() {
cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-${arch}" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}"
install -Dm755 usr/bin/* -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |