lockit

MEDIUM
maintainer Connor 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The source is a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.xz) fetched from a personal/unofficial domain (software.concise.cc) rather than from the project's official GitLab repository (gitlab.com/a4to/lockit). While the maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), this is still a personal host, not the upstream project's official release infrastructure. The package installs executables directly from this prebuilt artifact (install -Dm755 usr/bin/*), meaning any compromise or silent substitution of the hosted file would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system. A sha512sum and a PGP key are present, which mitigates but does not eliminate the risk — the PGP key's trustworthiness cannot be independently verified without checking it against a well-known keyserver and the upstream project. The correct rating is MEDIUM: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-official personal host) that is not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The source is a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.xz) fetched from a personal/unofficial domain (software.concise.cc) rather than from the project's official GitLab repository (gitlab.com/a4to/lockit). While the maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), this is still a personal host, not the upstream project's official release infrastructure. The package installs executables directly from this prebuilt artifact (install -Dm755 usr/bin/*), meaning any compromise or silent substitution of the hosted file would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system. A sha512sum and a PGP key are present, which mitigates but does not eliminate the risk — the PGP key's trustworthiness cannot be independently verified without checking it against a well-known keyserver and the upstream project. The correct rating is MEDIUM: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-official personal host) that is not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
2# ---
3pkgname=lockit
4pkgver=0.1.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Simple script that makes use of GPG to encrypt and decrypt files and folders"
7arch=(x86_64)
8url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
9license=('MIT')
10depends=(gnupg dialog)
11source=(
12 "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
13)
14sha512sums=(
15 'ac5824c525bea22a21a9a5b6adacdd94a98ef641958c108ac9f1fc66c2682e7a7bdb5e6b64c81b99e084b339d6969d01cfa586452abf0cf51be7692ac6e29ff7'
16)
17md5sums=(
18 '2b3055843a3c812ddf195f8d1e45288f'
19)
20validpgpkeys=(
21 '81BACEEBC3EA26E127166E4A819BB92A9A48160E'
22)
23
24package() {
25 cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-${arch}" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
26 cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}"
27
28 install -Dm755 usr/bin/* -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
29 install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
30}
31
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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