lockit

maintainer Connor · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The source is a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.xz) fetched from a personal/unofficial domain (software.concise.cc) rather than from the project's official GitLab repository (gitlab.com/a4to/lockit). While the maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), this is still a personal host, not the upstream project's official release infrastructure. The package installs executables directly from this prebuilt artifact (install -Dm755 usr/bin/*), meaning any compromise or silent substitution of the hosted file would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system. A sha512sum and a PGP key are present, which mitigates but does not eliminate the risk — the PGP key's trustworthiness cannot be independently verified without checking it against a well-known keyserver and the upstream project. The correct rating is MEDIUM: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-official personal host) that is not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:12 "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The source is a prebuilt binary package (.pkg.tar.xz) fetched from a personal/unofficial domain (software.concise.cc) rather than from the project's official GitLab repository (gitlab.com/a4to/lockit). While the maintainer's email domain matches the hosting domain (concise.cc), this is still a personal host, not the upstream project's official release infrastructure. The package installs executables directly from this prebuilt artifact (install -Dm755 usr/bin/*), meaning any compromise or silent substitution of the hosted file would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system. A sha512sum and a PGP key are present, which mitigates but does not eliminate the risk — the PGP key's trustworthiness cannot be independently verified without checking it against a well-known keyserver and the upstream project. The correct rating is MEDIUM: a real supply-chain concern (executed binary from a non-official personal host) that is not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Connor Etherington <connor@concise.cc>
    
      2# ---
    
      3pkgname=lockit
    
      4pkgver=0.1.0
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="Simple script that makes use of GPG to encrypt and decrypt files and folders"
    
      7arch=(x86_64)
    
      8url="https://gitlab.com/a4to/${pkgname}"
    
      9license=('MIT')
    
      10depends=(gnupg dialog)
    
      11source=(
    
      12  "https://software.concise.cc/x86_64/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-$arch.pkg.tar.xz"
    
      13)
    
      14sha512sums=(
    
      15  'ac5824c525bea22a21a9a5b6adacdd94a98ef641958c108ac9f1fc66c2682e7a7bdb5e6b64c81b99e084b339d6969d01cfa586452abf0cf51be7692ac6e29ff7'
    
      16)
    
      17md5sums=(
    
      18  '2b3055843a3c812ddf195f8d1e45288f'
    
      19)
    
      20validpgpkeys=(
    
      21  '81BACEEBC3EA26E127166E4A819BB92A9A48160E'
    
      22)
    
      23
    
      24package() {
    
      25  cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}-${pkgver}-${pkgrel}-${arch}" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
    
      26  cd "$srcdir/${pkgname}"
    
      27
    
      28  install -Dm755 usr/bin/* -t "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      29  install -Dm644 usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
    
      30}
    
      31
    
      32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2