lolka-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron binary (.deb) from a Yandex Cloud Storage bucket (storage.yandexcloud.net/lolka-electron). While Yandex Cloud is a legitimate cloud provider and this appears to be the vendor's own distribution channel for the Lolka app, it is not a well-known official distribution mirror and the binary is executed directly. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but the host is a personal/vendor S3-style bucket that could be silently replaced. The package installs a prebuilt Electron application binary directly into /opt and /usr, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the upstream bucket is compromised or the maintainer changes the binary without updating the checksum in the PKGBUILD, users would execute untrusted code. This is a classic medium-risk pattern — not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern due to the unofficial/personal cloud host serving executed binaries.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:23
source=("${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://storage.yandexcloud.net/lolka-electron/releases/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron binary (.deb) from a Yandex Cloud Storage bucket (storage.yandexcloud.net/lolka-electron). While Yandex Cloud is a legitimate cloud provider and this appears to be the vendor's own distribution channel for the Lolka app, it is not a well-known official distribution mirror and the binary is executed directly. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but the host is a personal/vendor S3-style bucket that could be silently replaced. The package installs a prebuilt Electron application binary directly into /opt and /usr, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the upstream bucket is compromised or the maintainer changes the binary without updating the checksum in the PKGBUILD, users would execute untrusted code. This is a classic medium-risk pattern — not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern due to the unofficial/personal cloud host serving executed binaries.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Mikhail Velichko <efklid@gmail.com>
# Maintainer: Lolka Team <support@lolka.app>
pkgname=lolka-bin
pkgver=1.0.100
pkgrel=1
#epoch=1
_pkgname=Lolka
pkgdesc="Lolka - voice chat and screen sharing application"
arch=("x86_64")
url="https://lolka.app"
license=("MIT")
categories=("network")
provides=(lolka)
conflicts=()
depends=("gtk3" "libnotify" "nss" "libxss" "libxtst" "xdg-utils" "util-linux-libs" "libsecret" "pipewire" "pipewire-pulse")
optdepends=(
"libappindicator: for system tray icon"
)
source=("${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://storage.yandexcloud.net/lolka-electron/releases/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
sha256sums=("15c25d3c45314d859db3753764d1b0e6d91d2528c410ef070f502483bdfc9b2c")
install=${pkgname}.install
prepare() {
tar -xf data.tar.xz
}
build() {
:
}
check() {
:
}
package() {
cp -dr --no-preserve=ownership opt usr "${pkgdir}"/
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |