lolka-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer labaman 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron binary (.deb) from a Yandex Cloud Storage bucket (storage.yandexcloud.net/lolka-electron). While Yandex Cloud is a legitimate cloud provider and this appears to be the vendor's own distribution channel for the Lolka app, it is not a well-known official distribution mirror and the binary is executed directly. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but the host is a personal/vendor S3-style bucket that could be silently replaced. The package installs a prebuilt Electron application binary directly into /opt and /usr, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the upstream bucket is compromised or the maintainer changes the binary without updating the checksum in the PKGBUILD, users would execute untrusted code. This is a classic medium-risk pattern — not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern due to the unofficial/personal cloud host serving executed binaries.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:23 source=("${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://storage.yandexcloud.net/lolka-electron/releases/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron binary (.deb) from a Yandex Cloud Storage bucket (storage.yandexcloud.net/lolka-electron). While Yandex Cloud is a legitimate cloud provider and this appears to be the vendor's own distribution channel for the Lolka app, it is not a well-known official distribution mirror and the binary is executed directly. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but the host is a personal/vendor S3-style bucket that could be silently replaced. The package installs a prebuilt Electron application binary directly into /opt and /usr, which is a real supply-chain concern: if the upstream bucket is compromised or the maintainer changes the binary without updating the checksum in the PKGBUILD, users would execute untrusted code. This is a classic medium-risk pattern — not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern due to the unofficial/personal cloud host serving executed binaries.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Mikhail Velichko <efklid@gmail.com>
2# Maintainer: Lolka Team <support@lolka.app>
3
4pkgname=lolka-bin
5pkgver=1.0.100
6pkgrel=1
7#epoch=1
8_pkgname=Lolka
9
10pkgdesc="Lolka - voice chat and screen sharing application"
11arch=("x86_64")
12url="https://lolka.app"
13license=("MIT")
14categories=("network")
15provides=(lolka)
16conflicts=()
17depends=("gtk3" "libnotify" "nss" "libxss" "libxtst" "xdg-utils" "util-linux-libs" "libsecret" "pipewire" "pipewire-pulse")
18
19optdepends=(
20 "libappindicator: for system tray icon"
21)
22
23source=("${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb::https://storage.yandexcloud.net/lolka-electron/releases/${_pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
24sha256sums=("15c25d3c45314d859db3753764d1b0e6d91d2528c410ef070f502483bdfc9b2c")
25install=${pkgname}.install
26
27prepare() {
28 tar -xf data.tar.xz
29}
30
31build() {
32 :
33}
34
35check() {
36 :
37}
38
39package() {
40 cp -dr --no-preserve=ownership opt usr "${pkgdir}"/
41}
42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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