luski-beta-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer JacobTech 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from a personal/vendor domain (jacobtech.com) via a dynamic API endpoint with SKIP checksum verification, meaning there is no integrity check on the downloaded binary. The binary is a .NET executable that gets installed and executed directly. The combination of: (1) a dynamic URL that can return different content at any time, (2) SKIP md5sums providing zero integrity guarantee, and (3) the pkgver() function making a live network call to determine the version — all from a personal domain — constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. Any compromise of jacobtech.com or a MITM attack would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system. This is not clearly malicious, but it is a real medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no checksum verification.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("luski-beta.tar.gz::https://www.jacobtech.com/Updater/GetPKG?directory=Luski&branch=Beta&selfcontained=false&platform=linux-x64")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from a personal/vendor domain (jacobtech.com) via a dynamic API endpoint with SKIP checksum verification, meaning there is no integrity check on the downloaded binary. The binary is a .NET executable that gets installed and executed directly. The combination of: (1) a dynamic URL that can return different content at any time, (2) SKIP md5sums providing zero integrity guarantee, and (3) the pkgver() function making a live network call to determine the version — all from a personal domain — constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. Any compromise of jacobtech.com or a MITM attack would result in arbitrary code execution on the user's system. This is not clearly malicious, but it is a real medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host with no checksum verification.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: JacobTech <Jacob@JacobTech.com>
2pkgname='luski-beta-bin'
3pkgver=0.0.0.1
4pkgrel=2
5pkgdesc="Simple open source chat app"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://www.jacobtech.com/Luski"
8license=('GPL')
9depends=('dotnet-runtime-8.0' 'curl')
10provides=('luski-beta')
11conflicts=('luski-beta-contained-bin')
12source=("luski-beta.tar.gz::https://www.jacobtech.com/Updater/GetPKG?directory=Luski&branch=Beta&selfcontained=false&platform=linux-x64")
13md5sums=('SKIP')
14
15pkgver() {
16 printf "$(curl -s https://www.jacobtech.com/Updater/GetProgramVersion\?directory\=Luski\&branch\=Beta\&selfcontaind\=false\&platform\=linux-x64)"
17}
18
19package() {
20 cd "${srcdir}"
21
22 install -dm 755 "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/luski-beta
23 install -dm 755 "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications
24 install -dm 755 "$pkgdir"/usr/bin
25
26 cp -r ${srcdir}/* "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/luski-beta/
27
28 touch "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/luski-beta.sh
29 cd "$pkgdir"/usr/bin
30 echo -n "#!/bin/sh
31exec /usr/lib/luski-beta/Luski \"\$@\"" >> "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/luski-beta.sh
32 ln -s luski-beta.sh luski-beta
33
34 touch "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/luski beta.desktop"
35 cd "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications
36 echo -n "[Desktop Entry]
37Name=Luski Beta
38Version=1.0
39GenericName=Luski Beta
40Comment=Luski is a free opensource chat app
41Exec=luski-beta %f
42Terminal=false
43Type=Application" >> "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/luski beta.desktop"
44
45
46 chmod 755 "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/luski-beta
47 chmod 755 "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/luski-beta/Luski
48 chmod 755 "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/luski-beta.sh
49}
50

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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