maixpy-ide

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer archive (a 7z containing executables: bin/, lib/, share/) from dl.sipeed.com, which is Sipeed's own official download server for their hardware products. This is a vendor-hosted binary, not a random personal host — Sipeed is the manufacturer of the Maix boards and MaixPy is their official IDE. However, the source is still a prebuilt binary blob from a non-GitHub/non-standard host with no upstream build reproducibility, and the package installs executable binaries and shared libraries directly into /opt and /usr/bin. The sha256 checksum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but cannot protect against a compromised upstream host substituting a new binary with the same filename. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern: legitimate vendor binary, but executed code from a non-standard host with no source build. Not high (no evidence of malice, vendor is the actual hardware maker), not low (it's executed binaries, not data).

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 "http://dl.sipeed.com/MAIX/MaixPy/ide/v${pkgver}/maixpy-ide-linux-x86_64-${pkgver}-installer-archive.7z"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary installer archive (a 7z containing executables: bin/, lib/, share/) from dl.sipeed.com, which is Sipeed's own official download server for their hardware products. This is a vendor-hosted binary, not a random personal host — Sipeed is the manufacturer of the Maix boards and MaixPy is their official IDE. However, the source is still a prebuilt binary blob from a non-GitHub/non-standard host with no upstream build reproducibility, and the package installs executable binaries and shared libraries directly into /opt and /usr/bin. The sha256 checksum provides integrity verification against tampering in transit, but cannot protect against a compromised upstream host substituting a new binary with the same filename. This is a classic medium-severity supply-chain concern: legitimate vendor binary, but executed code from a non-standard host with no source build. Not high (no evidence of malice, vendor is the actual hardware maker), not low (it's executed binaries, not data).

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Masanori Ohgita <mp_aur[at]ohgita[dot]info>
2pkgname=maixpy-ide
3pkgver=0.2.3
4pkgrel=2
5pkgdesc="Micropython env for Sipeed Maix boards"
6url="https://github.com/sipeed/MaixPy"
7arch=('x86_64')
8license=('Apache')
9depends=('libusb' 'python-pyusb' 'qt5-multimedia' 'qt5-script' 'qt5-svg' 'qt5-tools' 'qt5-webengine' 'qt5-3d')
10builddepends=()
11source=(
12 "http://dl.sipeed.com/MAIX/MaixPy/ide/v${pkgver}/maixpy-ide-linux-x86_64-${pkgver}-installer-archive.7z"
13)
14sha256sums=(
15 'a04cedfe656781230d9ce0340e87afa86cc3d35e1fca7e1dfbd1f4f901ada161'
16)
17install=maixpy-ide.install
18
19package() {
20
21 cd "${srcdir}"
22
23 # Install the application to /opt/maixpy-ide/
24 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/"
25 cp -a share/ "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/"
26 cp -a lib/ "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/"
27 cp -a bin/ "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/"
28 cp -a README.txt "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/"
29 chmod 755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/bin/maixpyide.sh"
30
31 # Add the symbolic link to /usr/bin/
32 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/"
33 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/bin/maixpyide.sh" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
34
35 # Add the desktop entry
36 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
37 install -Dm644 "../${pkgname}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
38
39}
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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